Independence After Matsqui? by Haigh, Richard & Smith, Jim
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1998 
Independence After Matsqui? 
Richard Haigh 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, rhaigh@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Jim Smith 
Source Publication: 
Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice. Volume 11 (1998), p. 101-154. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Haigh, Richard. “Independence After Matsqui?” Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice. 11 
(1998): 101-154. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 
Independence After M atsqui? 
Richard Haigh* and Jim Smith** 
The authors look at the Supreme Court's latest fully reasoned decision on 
independence in Canadian Pacific v. Matsqui, where native tribunals were found to be 
biased because of certain institutional characteristics. The authors argue that the 
court employs, on the one hand, a \'ery simplified analysis of independence, but at the 
same time, sets standards for testing independence and bias in tribunals that are 
impossible to adequately quantify in practice. Neither the reasoning of Lamer C.J, nor 
Sopinka J. is adequate to address the full range of tribunal experience; in fact, the 
Supreme Court examines administrative tribunals as if they were simply smaller 
courts, without recognizing their inhere/If differences. Subsequent cases on this point 
have failed to take into accou/lf the differences in these opinions. The authors 
conclude by noting the complexity of issues regarding bias, such as institutional 
independence, and question the direction of Canadian jurfaprudence in this area. 
Les auteurs examinent I' arrl!t le plus recent de la Cour supreme du Canada en 
matiere d' independance judiciaire, !' arrf!t Canadien Pacifique c. Matsqui, clans lequel 
on a juge que des tribunaux aborigenes eraient partiaux en raison de certaines 
caracteristiques institutionnelles. Les auteurs soumettent que la Cour a, d' 1111 cote, eu 
recours a une analyse simplifiee du concept d' independance, tout en erablissant du 
meme soujfle des criteres pour evaluer l'independance et la partialite des tribunaux, 
criteres s' averant impossible a quantifier correctement dans la pratique. Ni I' opinion 
de Lamer, J.C.C., ni ce!le de Sopinka, J., n' arrive a poser correctement la question du 
vaste champ d' expertise du tribunal administratif; en fair, la Cour supreme examine 
!es tribunaux administratifs comme s' ii s' agissait simplement de plus petits tribunaux, 
.. 
Research Fellow/Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin University, Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia . 
LL.B., Toronto, Canada. 
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sans reconnaftre leurs particularites inherentes. Des opinions rendues dans des 
affaires subsequentes porta/lf sur le meme point ont omis de prendre ces differences en 
consideration. Les auteurs concluent en 110tant la complexite des questions relatives a 
la partialite, telle celle de!' independance judiciaire, et s' interrogent sur l' orientation 
qu' a pris la jurisprudence canadienne dans ce domaine. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Finding the right balance between independence and 
responsibility in democratic institutions is tricky. The independent 
spirit, praised as a personal quality, is carried over into our political 
institutions, but is tempered by a need for accountability, through such 
cornerstones as the separation of powers, the rule of law and 
independence of the judiciary.1 These ideas continue in our 
administrative tribunals. We want our tribunals to be independent in 
order to imbue them with court-like legitimacy. 2 But this 
independence is never absolute. Thus, depending on such factors as 
the nature of the tribunal, the form of decision-making power and the 
importance of the dispute to be resolved, independence may be 
restricted. Optimizing the operating conditions for administrative 
tribunals is, therefore, a constant governmental pastime.3 
Probably no one is cited more on this point than A.V. Dicey, whose views on 
Parliamentary sovereignty, rule of law, and limited separation of powers are still 
accepted in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. See An Introduction to the Study of 
the law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: MacMillan Press, 1965). 
See, for example, H.N. Janisch, "Independence of Administrative Tribunals: In 
Praise of 'Structural Heretics"' (1987-88) l C.J.A.L.P. lat 1-2. 
See the points raised by M. Rankin, "Adjudication, Independence and 
Responsibility: The Delicate Balance" (1991) 2 Tribune (CCAT) 18 at 18, 21; see 
also A. Lamer, "The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core 
Values in Times of Change," (1996) 45 U.N.B.L.J. 3 [1996 Ivan C. Rand 
Memorial Lecture, University of New Brunswick]. Even the judiciary may be 
subject to economic controls on its independence if some commentators have 
their way. Albertan W. Renke, for example, argues in Invoking Independence: 
Judicial Independence as a No-cut Wage Guarantee (Points of View Number 5) 
(Calgary: Centre for Constitutional Studies, 1994) that the judiciary must not be 
exempted from the Canadian people's across-the-board economic sacrifice. In 
Provincial Court Judge Assn. (Manitoba) v. Manotoba (Minister of Justice) 
(1997), 46 C.R.R. (2d) 1, the S.C.C. holds that Provincial Court judges, as 
judges, are independent, and protected by s. l l(d) of the Charter. Interestingly, 
Lamer C.J. 's lead judgment refers to the same core characteristics of judicial 
independence (security of tenure, financial security and administrative 
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Debate, both academic and judicial, concerning the 
appropriate level of independence required by administrative tribunals 
has gone on for decades.4 More recently, attention has shifted from 
individual member independence, to a tentative exploration of the 
concept of "institutional independence." The idea has merit, as it 
recognizes systemic influences on decision-making. But any fully-
elaborated position on institutional independence will have to fulfil 
two tasks. First, it will have to provide a rational basis for the concept 
itself. Second, it should clearly set out the concept's distinguishing 
characteristics. It is of more than passing interest that the courts 
themselves will be the final arbiters of whatever standard -
judicialized or dejudicialized - arises. 
This paper is divided into three main parts. The first part is a 
brief sketch of the recent history and general context in which any 
consideration of tribunal independence must take place. In the second 
part, the case of Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band 5 is 
introduced. An overview of the reasoning of Lamer C.J. and Sopinka 
J. follows, each of whom provides extensive (albeit obiter) 
consideration of the institutional independence of administrative 
tribunals. The third part is a more critical analysis of the judgment, 
using Lamer C.J.'s reasoning as a jumping off point and then 
exploring the application of Matsqui in two subsequent cases on bias. 
The conclusion that follows outlines certain problems unresolved by 
the case, and suggests appropriate directions for the future. 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE 
IN A NUTSHELL 
Unlike some areas of administrative law, in which the 
theoretical literature and the cases experience significant interplay,6 
independence) and the two dimensions of individual independence and 
institutional independence. The judgment arrived too late to be included in this 
article. 
See, generally, Part 2 of this paper. 
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 129, 26 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, [1995] 2 
C.N.L.R. 92, 177 N.R. 325 [hereinafter Matsqui, cited to Admin L.R. in the body 
of the text]. 
Such as in the areas of standard of review or jurisdiction, in which it is quite 
likely to find academic writing cited as authority in cases, and the theoretical 
writings often centred around a single or set of cases. 
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academic and judicial considerations of independence seem to have 
developed along two somewhat distinct lines. While the literature 
concerns itself primarily with optimizing agency organization and 
function within a matrix of administrative agencies serving 
adjudicative, policymaking or mixed functions, the moderate number 
of cases considering tribunal independence do so based on a small, 
tentative set of criteria. These criteria are painstakingly teased out 
from either or both of the administrative law test for reasonable 
apprehension of bias, and concepts gathered from judicial 
independence. 
The courts have held independence and impartiality to be 
separate and distinct values or requirements. Tribunal impartiality is 
determined by the "state of mind" of the decision-maker whereas 
independence is a matter of the status of the tribunal which extends 
beyond the subjective attitude of the decision-maker. But the concern 
with status is generally looked at in respect of three factors - amount 
of remuneration, security of tenure for appointed members and degree 
of control over the appointment process.7 
In contrast, a wealth of commissions, committees, task forces, 
working groups and occasional papers published in academic journals, 
have analyzed the issue of administrative tribunal bias differently. 
These studies have been extensively canvassed by Robert Macaulay 
and James Sprague in their three-volume Practice and Procedure 
Before Administrative Tribunals, 8 and by Margot Priest, in her paper 
delivered at the 1992 Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lecture 
series.9 Priest's survey shows that institutional independence is 
discussed in a number of reports. JO 
IO 
The classic test for reasonable apprehension of bias was laid out by de Grandpre 
J. in Committee for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), infra 
note 66. See discussion regarding Matsqui, infra at Part 3(c), for a full review of 
these principles. 
R.W. Macaulay & J.L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure Before Administrative 
Tribunals, 3 volumes (Toronto: Carswell, 1988). 
M.D. Priest, "Structure and Accountability of Administrative Agencies" in Law 
Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 
1992: Administrative Law: Principles, Practice and Pluralism (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1993) 11. 
Priest, ibid, provides a comprehensive list of studies related to administrative 
independence. See for example, from Priest, the Glassco Commission (at 15), the 
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Certain informal conclusions about the relative importance of 
various factors may be drawn from these reports and studies. In areas 
bearing on independence, much attention has been directed to the 
tenure and appointment process,11 with far less attention to 
remuneration. Administrative control is recognized as important, as is 
the need for separate supervisory, recruitment and disciplinary bodies 
and the training for members of tribunals. Finally, the continuing 
problem of patronage appointments is addressed through growing 
recognition that the process of appointment may need complete 
reassessment. To date, few, if any, of the recommendations have been 
acted upon. 
3. CANADIAN PACIFIC LTD. v. MATSQUI INDIAN BAND 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Matsqui, 12 explores the issue 
of independence of administrative tribunals in some depth. What the 
opining justices arguably deliver are two irreconcilable approaches to 
the question: one which advises abstract formalism; the other which 
advises a more pragmatic approach but provides little in the way of 
new insight. 
(a) History of the Case 
The question giving rise to the case was a deceptively simple 
one. Was Canadian Pacific Limited [hereinafter C.P.], obliged, before 
applying for judicial review, to avail itself of the appeal processes 
established by a number of First Nation bands under the Indian Ad3 in 
order to question the jurisdiction of those bands to assess property 




Lambert Commission (at 16), the Nielsen Task Force on Agencies Study Team 
(at 23), the Ouellette Report (at 36), the Macaulay study Directions (at 31-34) 
and the Ratushny Report (24-26), amongst others. 
Though the studies might often speak of overwhelming problems rationalizing 
patronage and secrecy in appointments, their recommendations most often use 
this more fastidious term. 
Supra note 5. 
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, as amended by R.S.C. 1985, c. 17 (4th Supp.). 
I 06 CDN. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE [11 CJ.A.LP.] 
Trial Division.14 In striking C.P.'s application for judicial review, 
Joyal J. accepted the argument of the Matsqui Indian Band that their 
a~sessment by-laws, in providing for a right of appeal to an appeal 
tribunal and the Federal Court, Trial Division, were an adequate 
alternative remedy .15 
C.P. appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal. 16 
Speaking for a unanimous panel, Pratte J.A. allowed the appeal on 
jurisdictional grounds, based on errors made by Joyal J. below. These 
four e1TOrs were: (I) questions of statutory interpretation relating to 
the accuracy of C.P.'s title to land and what flows therefrom were 
beyond the jurisdiction of the native appeal tribunals; (2) irrelevant 
policy considerations concerning the importance of native self 
government were relied upon; (3) the tribunal lacked experience in 
conducting a trial; and (4) creating an eventual appeal to the Federal 
Court was ultra vires all of the native bands. The purely procedural 
qu.estion of whether the Federal Court of Appeal was correct in setting 
aside the Trial Division decision, dismissing the band's motion to 
strike and allowing C.P.'s application for judicial review of the native 
bands' ability to determine rights of appeal, was appealed by the 
Matsqui Indian Band to the Supreme Court. 
The final result in Matsqui, in a sense, both does and does not 
turn on consideration of the issue of independence of an administrative 
tribunal. The judgment provides a tortuous set of opinions, setting out 
four distinct positions. L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier and 
Iacobucci JJ., upheld the appeal on three grounds: that there was an 




Reported at (1993] 1 F.C. 74, 58 F.T.R. 23 (T.D.). 
Ibid. Joyal J. did not accept the first of the Band's two grounds of appeal - that 
the decision could not be the subject of judicial review since the assessment by-
laws expressly provided for a right of appeal to the Federal Court - Trial 
Division. The issue of a statutory bar to judicial review under s. 18.5 of the 
Federal Court Act was not argued in the Federal Court of Appeal (see [1993] 2 
F.C. 641, (1994] l C.N.L.R. 66, 153 N.R. 307); nevertheless, Pratte J.A. found 
there was no merit in the submission (at 646-647(F.C.)). The appeal went forward 
to the Supreme Court on the second ground, whether there had been a proper 
exercise of discretion below regarding the doctrine of adequate alternative 
remedy (as developed in Hare/kin v. University of Regina, (1979] 2 S.C.R. 561, 
(1979] 3 W.W.R. 676, 96 D.L.R. (3d) 14, 26 N.R. 364). 
Reported at (1993] 2 F.C. 641, 58 F.T.R. 23 (C.A.) (Pratte, Decary and 
Robertson JJ.A. concurring). 
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adequacy and that there was no evidence of either institutional 
partiality or institutional dependence (because both were too 
premature). Lamer C.J. and Cory J., confirmed both that there was an 
appropriate exercise of discretion below on the issue of tribunal 
adequacy and that there was no evidence of inadequate institutional 
impartiality (again holding that it was a premature question). 
However, they dismissed the appeal on the issue of institutional 
~ndependence (on the basis that the tribunal was not sufficiently 
independent, and thus did not provide an adequate alternative 
:emedy). McLachlin and Major JJ. dismissed the appeal solely on the 
issue of lack of discretion below, since lack of jurisdiction in the Band 
appeal process precluded the availability of an adequate alternative 
remedy. They rendered no opinion on institutional impartiality or on 
institutional independence. LaForest J. also dismissed the appeal, also 
on the issue of lack of discretion below to dismiss the application for 
judicial review, but for different reasons from those of McLachlin and 
Major JJ. LaForest J. also rendered no opinion on the issues of 
institutional impartiality or institutional independence. 
It is apparent that a clear majority - six justices of nine -
consider the issues of institutional impartiality and institutional 
independence relevant to the appeal. However, it is a minority of 
three, who do not see those issues as relevant, who carry the day, 
owing to a 4/2 split among those who do. The fact that Chief Justice 
Lamer and Justice Cory not only consider the issues relevant, but 
reason through, provide criteria, and then determine that the particular 
tribunal is inadequate under those criteria is, in a sense, essentially 
determinative of the final outcome of the appeal. 
Unfortunately, playing out the numbers game is unsettling if 
one is looking for guidance from our highest court on the issue of an 
appropriate standard by which to judge tribunal independence. Six 
justices (L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Cory JJ. and 
Lamer C.J.) hold that it is at least something to consider. Four of those 
six, while recognizing the validity of the concept of institutional 
independence, are content to see whether it manifests itself in the 
pr~cti~es of the tribunal. The remaining two propose taking an 
objective look at the empowering legislation. Numerically, therefore, 
twice as many justices think that a possible apprehension of lack of 
institutional independence based solely on an examination of the 
empowering legislation should not act as a barrier to tribunal decision-
making, as think that it should. However, the former four languish in 
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dissent in Matsqui, while Lamer and Cory JJ. find themselves a 
pyrrhically-victorious rump among the majority in the result. 
Questions naturally arise about the weight to be attributed to Lamer J. 
versus Sopinka J.'s reasoning, and the impact either or both lines of 
reasoning will have on future cases. 17 
Before engaging in a detailed analysis of the reasoning 
employed by the various groupings of justices, we will look at the 
background of the regulatory scheme giving rise to the particular 
dispute raised in Matsqui. 
(b) The Matsqui Tribunal 
(i) The Nature of Native Taxation Tribunals 
After a lengthy negotiation process between federal and 
provincial governments and representatives of Aboriginal peoples, the 
Indian Ad8 was amended in 1988 to allow Indian bands to establish 
by-laws providing for the taxation of real property on reserve lands. In 
1992, pursuant to the amended provisions of the Indian Act, 19 seven 
Indian bands in British Columbia developed taxation and assessment 
by-laws. As required by s. 83( 1) of the Indian Act, these by-laws were 
submitted for and received approval by the Minister prior to their 
implementation. Each by-law set up a comprehensive taxation scheme 
for property on the reserve, including assessment rolls, notices of 
assessment, the appointment of courts of revision or boards of review 
to hear appeals from assessment, followed by an appeal to the Federal 
Court, Trial Division if necessary. The Matsqui band's by-law 
interposed a second appeal to an assessment review committee prior to 
recourse to the Federal Court. Despite this difference, and minor 
variations as noted below between the first native appellate bodies, the 
seven cases that culminated in Matsqui were heard concurrently at all 
levels, as turning on essentially identical facts. 
17 
19 
Arguably the case might actually lack a ratio to isolate, in view of the effects of 
splits of opinion which allowed a three-judge minority to carry the day on an 
issue other than institutional independence. It could be seen as a portentous sign 
that the Supreme Court, usually following the tightly rendered decision making 
style of the United States Supreme Court, is moving towards an individualistic, 
House of Lords, High Court of Australia style. 
Indian Act, supra note 13. 
Ibid., s. 83(1)-(6). 
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The Matsqui first level review tribunal, the court of revision,20 
is composed of members appointed by the Chief and Band Council by 
resolution (s. 27 A), who must take an oath to decide all complaints 
impartially (s. 27D). Members are reimbursed for expenses incurred 
and might be paid "reasonable remuneration" (s. 27C). The Siska 
band, like the other five, has a single board of review level of appeal. 
Its members, only one of whom can be a member of the Siska Indian 
Band,21 are also appointed by the Chief and Band Council (s. 40. l ), 
who can order the payment of remuneration to members (s. 40.3). All 
members are reimbursed expenses incurred in carrying out their duties 
(s. 40.3). All members must swear or affirm an oath of impartiality, 
identical to the Matsqui oath (s. 40.4). 
The Matsqui band's second level of appeal, the assessment 
review committee,22 is established annually by the Chief and Band 
Council by resolution (s. 35A), who also establishes the terms of 
appointment, duties and remuneration of the members (s. 35B). The 
three-member tribunal must be composed of (i) a person qualified to 
practise law in the province or who is currently or formerly a judge of 
the province (s. 35A. l ); (ii) a former member of the provincial 
assessment appeal committee (s. 35A.2); and (iii) a member or agent 
of the Matsqui band without conflict of interest in any appealed 
assessment (s. 35A.3). One of the three members must be or have been 
an accredited land appraiser (s. 35A.4). An appeal to this level of 
review can arise from the person assessed, the assessor, the 
commissioner below, or from the Band itself (s. 49A). 
The Indian Taxation Advisory Board was also involved, 
having published materials assisting the bands in designing and 
establishing their taxation tribunals. 23 This material emphasized the 
common law principles of a right to a hearing, by an impartial 






Established by s. 27 of the Matsqui by-law. References to particular subsections 
of the by-law are contained in parentheses within the text, where appropriate. 
Section 40.2 ·of the Siska by-law. References in parentheses a.re to the appropriate 
sections of this by-law. 
Established bys. 35 of the Matsqui by-law. 
This material included the 1990 manual, Introduction to Real Property Taxation 
on Reserve [sic], to which Lamer CJ. refers in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35. The 
Indian Taxation Advisory Board also appeared as intervenors at the S.C.C. 
Cite to Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35-36. 
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mechanisms are put in place, they will have to adhere to the principles 
of natural justice, since ... the appeal is in effect a subsequent 
hearing."25 Lamer J. summarized what he considered to be the salient 
generic features of these tribunals as follows: 
.... [M]embers of the Siska Board of Review and the Matsqui Court of 
Revision have no guarantee of salary. Under the Matsqui By-law, 
members of the Court of Revision "may" receive remuneration, 
while the Siska By-law also uses permissive language. 
On the subject of security of tenure, the Matsqui tribunals are to be 
appointed each year, although the terms of appointment are to be left 
to the Chief and Band Council. One might presume that the members 
of the tribunals are appointed for one-year terms; however, there is 
nothing in the Matsqui By-law protecting members from arbitrary 
dismissal mid-term. The Siska By-law is silent on all aspects of the 
appointment of tribunal members.26 
Two further points should be noted. First, although in their 
submissions to the Supreme Court alleging reasonable apprehension of 
bias, C.P. drew a clear distinction between the source of bias for non-
native members and native members of the tribunals,27 this distinction 
was ignored by the Court. Second, the Court chose not to distinguish 
Matsqui band's second level of appeal as substantially (or 
procedurally) different from the other bands' single level of appeal. 
(ii) Tracing the Treatment of the Bias Argument 
Although C.P. presented arguments concerning reasonable 
apprehension of bias at both levels of the Federal Court, in neither 
instance did it receive serious consideration, nor was it considered 




Matsqui, ibid. Dewar v. Ontario (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 334, 41 Admin. L.R. (2d) 
202, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 273, 92 O.A.C. 264 (Div. Ct.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
granted (October 29, 1996), Doc. CA Ml8920 (Ont. C.A.) provides an interesting 
"solution" to Lamer C.J.'s concern about truncated terms of office. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 42. 
The source of bias for band members of tribunals was alleged to lay in their direct 
and personal interest in the benefit of taxes spent on the reserve; the source of 
bias for non-Indian members was alleged to be the uncertainty of remuneration 
and insecurity of tenure or reappointment. Matsqui, supra note 5 at 31. 
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Joyal J., in deciding to deny C.P. Ltd. recourse to judicial review on 
the ground that there was an adequate alternative remedy, dismissed 
the allegation as premature in a few lines near the end of his judgment: 
It is true, as pointed out by applicant's counsel, that the first group of 
by-laws to which I have referred provides in section 40(2) that 
Boards of review shall consist of three members, only one of whom 
may be a member of the Indian band. Counsel argues bias. At best, 
this is a premature argument, no evidence being before me as to the 
composition of any Board of review.28 [emphasis added] 
Although reasonable apprehension of bias was apparently argued by 
counsel for Canadian Pacific at the Federal Court of Appeal,29 Pratte 
J.A. is silent on the issue in his reasons.30 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, however, reasonable 
apprehension of bias, by way of a lack of sufficient institutional 
independence, becomes determinative (except in the technical sense) 
of the appeaJ.31 Lamer C.J. introduces the issue of bias in the fout1h of 
four questions he poses regarding the exercise of discretion pursuant 
to the adequate alternative remedy principle: 
(iv) Is there a reasonable apprehension of bias in the appeal tribunals, 
which would evidence the inadequacy of the statutory appeal 
? JO procedures. -
Lamer C.J. determines that Joyal J. neither based his discretionary 
decision regarding the adequacy of the alternative remedy on 
irrelevant factors, nor acted unreasonably in light of the factors he did 
consider. Then Lamer C.J. considers the question of bias at length, as 
a relevant factor that Joyal J. failed to take into account. As noted, he 







As quoted in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 47. 
Mentioned by Lamer C.J. in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35, in the course of 
justifying his attention to the issue. 
Matsqui, supra note 5. 
It is interesting to observe that the issue of independence assumes such 
importance at the eleventh hour. It would be fascinating to explore theories as to 
why the four federal court judges missed its importance. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 25. 
Cory J. concurs with Lamer C.J. throughout. Sopinka, Gonthier, Iacobucci and 
L'Heureux-Dube JJ. agree with him on bias generally and on institutional 
impartiality. 
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question of bias and the first component question of institutional 
impartiality. On the second specific component question, that of 
institutional independence, only Lamer and Cory JJ. find the tribunal 
insufficiently independent. This is sufficient, however, to cause the 
appeal to fail. The result allowed Canadian Pacific to return to the 
Federal Court, Trial Division for judicial review only on the 
substantive question of whether their land was "in the reserve" and 
thus taxable - where they succeeded.34 However, at least one 
commentator has pointed out that a much more far-reaching 
implication of the finding on independence is to render the entire 
Indian taxation appeal regime as it stood at that time arguably 
ineffective. 35 
(c) The Issue of Independence at the Supreme Court 
(i) The Reasoning of Lamer CJ. 
Its effect on the result aside, there are at least four reasons 
why Lamer C.J.'s extended reasoning on the independence of the 
native administrative tribunals merits close examination. First, it, 
along with Sopinka J.'s dissent, comprises the latest and most 
extensive discussion of the issue of tribunal independence, to which 
lower courts and legislators will attempt to look for guidance.36 
Second, the question of the status of administrative tribunal 
independence is an ongoing subject of discussion; however, 
government, in its structuring of administrative tribunals, seems to 
35 
36 
See C.P. Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1996] 3 F.C. 373, (1997] 2 C.N.L.R. 16, 
134 D.L.R. (4th) 555, 111 F.T.R. 161 (T.D.). 
P. Bryden, "Developments in the Supreme Court 1994-1995 Term" (1996) 7 
Supreme Court L.R. 27 at 55. Query what course of action can now be taken by 
parties dissatisfied with their assessment (or with the fact of being assessed, in 
some cases). 
2747-3174 Quebec Inc. v. Quebec (Regie des permis d' a/cool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 
919, 42 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 205 N.R. 1, is a more recent 
decision on bias. However, the case (which sees Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. both 
part of an 8-1 majority) turns on the issue of the intersection between impartiality 
and independence, and in the discussion on independence, simply reviews the 
same components - security of tenure, financial security and administrative 
control - discussed here. The major disagreements between Lamer C.J. and 
Sopinka J. seem to be little more than historical curiosities. 
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have paid little heed to such theorizing, producing surprisingly 
repetitious complaint and advice from decade to decade.37 Third, 
analytical tools for assessing agencies on the subject of independence 
are still woefully underdeveloped.38 Fourth, despite a certain amount 
of common ground, Lamer J.'s formalist approach - that sufficiency 
of institutional independence may be assessed solely by examining the 
legislation - stands in stark contrast to Sopinka J.'s holding that 
institutional independence may only be assessed on the basis of the 
agency in action. 
A. The General Category: Bias 
A reasonable apprehension of bias violates what has been 
described as the second limb of the rules of natural justice.39 It is 
considered in two aspects - impartiality and independence - in 
Matsqui. Lamer CJ. is careful to lay the groundwork on both limbs in 
order to provide his opinion on institutional independence. 
Lamer CJ. first acknowledges the important role Native 
taxing power plays in encouraging self-government. He asserts that 
those "underlying purpose and functions ... provide considerable 
guidance in applying the principles of administrative law to the 
statutory provisions at issue here.'"0 As a result of this, he employs a 
purposive and functional approach where appropriate, although aware 
that the matter is different from Beetz J.'s original approach." This 
approach allows the Court's inquiry to be focused directly on the 
intent of the legislator rather than on interpreting isolated provisions.42 
After examining the history and application of the adequate 







See supra, Part 2. 
In the cases relied upon by Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J., see sections A. - C. of this 
part 3, below. 
J.M. Evans et al., Administratfre Law: Cases, Texts and Materials, 4th ed., 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1995) at 381. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 19. 
U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, (1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 35 Admin. L.R. 153, 89 
C.L.L.C. 14,045, 95 N.R. 161, 24 0.A.C. 244 (per Beetz J.) in which the 
approach was adopted in a jurisdictional analysis. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 19. 
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set of factors to determine whether judicial review or a statutory 
appeal procedure is apposite. The set of factors, including allegations 
of bias, must remain open-ended to allow for the courts to isolate and 
balance the relevant factors.43 
In the three issues that precede the question of bias, Lamer 
C.J. maintains a consistently purposive approach. He approves of 
Joyal J. 's attention to the important purpose of the empowering 
legislation and recognition of Parliament's intention to allow bands to 
develop their own appeal procedures. At the same time, Lamer C.J. 
challenges the Federal Court of Appeal's ruling that setting a final 
appeal to the Federal Court, Trial Division is ultra vires, given 
Parliament's intention to give the bands considerable scope for 
creating appeal procedures and subsequent Ministerial approval of the 
regime. But it is the final issue - allegations of bias evidencing 
inadequacy of the appeal tribunals - that Lamer C.J. posits as a 
relevant factor not considered by Joyal J.44 
Lamer CJ. opens his analysis of the reasonable apprehension 
of bias by looking at the Charter.45 He observes that s. l l(d) of the 
Charter does not apply directly, as the case does not involve someone 
charged with an offence, but then turns to R. v. Valente46 for assistance 
regarding the correct approach to be taken for issues of bias, and 
particularly the issues of independence and impartiality. In Valente, 
LeDain J. stated that independence and impartiality are separate and 





... [Impartiality is] a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in 
relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case ... [whereas 
independence] .. reflects or embodies the traditional constitutional 
value of judicial independence. As such, [independence] connotes 
not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial 
functions, but a status or relationship to others ... that rests on 
objective conditions or guarantees.47 
Matsqui, ibid at 24. 
Matsqui, ibid at 26, 30. 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.). [hereinafter Charter.] 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 49 C.R. (3d) 97, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 19 C.R.R. 354, 24 
D.L.R. (4th) 161, 37 M.V.R. 9 (per LeDain J.) [hereinafter Valente]. 
Valente, supra note 46 at 685. Query whether it would have been more 
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Lamer C.J. emphasizes that Valente stands for the proposition that 
judicial independence involves both individual independence and 
institutional independence.48 Lamer C.J. then relies on his own 
reasoning in R. v. Genereux49 to elaborate. Regarding the approach to 
determining tribunal impartiality 
.. .the appropriate frame of reference is the "state of mind" of the 
decision-maker. The circumstances of an individual case must be 
examined to determine whether. . .the decision-maker. .. will be 
subjectively biased in the particular situation. 
Whereas independence is a matter of the status of the tribunal, which 
... extends beyond the subjective attitude of the decision-maker .... The 
status of a tribunal must guarantee not only its freedom from 
interference by the executive and legislative branches of government 
but also by any other external force, such as business or corporate 
interests or other pressure groups.50 
Independence is further separated into two categories: the "appearance 
of impartiality" regarding who may sit on the tribunal and the 
"appearance of independence of these members" regarding their 
security of tenure and remuneration. He points out that bias may not 
be actual, but simply a reasonable apprehension thereof flowing from 
the institutional structure. 51 
B. Impartiality 
Given that C.P. has not appealed to the tribunal, and band 
members have not been appointed to a tribunal, Lamer CJ. next 
agrees with Joyal J. that the allegation of bias on the basis of 





convincing for Lamer C.J. to tie these objective conditions back in to the 
supposedly invidious effect they will have on the individual decision-maker, 
producing a reasonable apprehension of bias akin to the "corporate taint" 
argument. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32. 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, 70 C.C.C. (3d) I, 8 C.R.R. (2cl) 89, 88 D.L.R. (4th) l IO, 
133 N.R. 241 [hereinafter Genereux]. 
Genereux.ibid. Both quotes are at 283-284. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32. 
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R. v. Lippe,52 where he asserted the logical necessity of recognizing the 
existence of the concept of institutional or structural impartiality in 
addition to the concept of individual impartiality. This is based on the 
perception that independence has both an individual and institutional 
aspect.53 It developed into a threshold test in Lippe that asks will there 
be a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a fully informed 
person in a substantial number of cases?54 
The allegations in Matsqui fail to meet this threshold, 
according to Lamer C.J., in two regards. First, community interest 
representation on boards does not give rise to bias based on the finding 
of Cory J. in the Newfoundland Telephone case.55 Second, Lamer C.J. 
approves Iacobucci J.'s functional approach in Pearlman,56 which 
assesses allegations of pecuniary bias within a wider legislative and 
relevant experiential framework. The functional approach requires 
examining not just the tribunal's empowering legislation, but the 
wider context of the self-governing professions generally. 
Accordingly, any general allegations of structural bias are necessarily 
too remote and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.57 In this 








[1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 at 140, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 127 [hereinafter Lippe]. Lamer C.J. 
is, as has been observed in some quarters, rather prone to "bootstrapping." 
Evidence of this is delightfully presented in P. McCormick, "The Supreme Court 
Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation on the Supreme Court of Canada 
1989-1993" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 453. 
Lippe, ibid, cited in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32-33. 
Lippe, ibid at 144 (emphasis in the original). 
Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of 
Public Utilities), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 623 at 635, 4 Admin. LR. (2d) 121, 89 D.L.R. 
(4th) 289, 134 N.R. 241, 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271 (Cory J.) [hereinafter 
Newfoundland Telephone]. Similarly, the presence of "interest" in tripartite 
labour tribunals is considered acceptable. 
Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, (1991] 2 S.C.R. 869, 2 
Admin. L.R. 185, (1991] 6 W.W.R. 289, 6 C.R.R. (2d) 259, 84 D.L.R. (4th) !05 
[hereinafter Pearlman]. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 34. 
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C. Independence 
The Valente principles establish areas of potential concern 
with independence. Lack of payment, lack of security of tenure, and 
appointment by band chiefs and councils were found determinative in 
Valente.
58 
According to Lamer C.J., Joyal J. committed a reversible 
error by not considering whether these conditions compromised the 
tribunals' structural integrity. 59 
However, before outlining his analysis on this sub-issue, 
Lamer C.J. repudiates the use of context in dealing with structural 
independence. To him, it may dilute the requirements of natural 
justice: 
... [W]hile I agree that the larger context of Aboriginal self-
government informs the determination of whether the statutory 
appeal procedures ... constitute an adequate alternative remedy .. ./ 
cannot agree ... that this context is relevant to the question of tvhether 
the bands' tribunals give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias 
at an institutional level. In my view, principles of natural justice 
apply to the band's tribunals as they would apply to any tribunal 
perfo1ming similar functions. 60 [emphasis added] 
Note how Lamer C.J. switches back to the term "bias" rather than 
using "independence" or "impartiality." Further, he dismisses context 
immediately after performing a context-based analysis on the issue of 
apprehension of insufficient structural impartiality (preferring to call it 
"functional")6'. He invokes the principles of natural justice as his 
reason for rejecting policy considerations, as such consideration would 
"dilute natural justice" in some unspecified way.62 
Once again Lamer C.J. uses Valente as his analytical starting 
point. Relying on Gonthier J. 's statement about judicial independence 
in /. W.A. v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd.,63 Lamer C.J. 







See Valente, supra note 46 at headings III-V. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35. 
Matsqui, ibid at 35. 
See discussion at notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35. 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 282 at 332, 42 Admin. L.R. 1, 90 C.L.L.C. 14,007, 69 D.L.R. 
(4th) 524, 105 N.R. 161. [hereinafter Consolidated Bathurst] 
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acknowledge, however, that a strict application of them is not always 
warranted in an administrative context.64 But that even absent 
constitutional protection, judicial independence, as part of the rules of 
natural justice, pertains to administrative tribunals because a party 
deserves a hearing that is not only independent in fact, but also 
appears independent.65 Retreating once again to the term "bias," Lamer 
C.J. sets out the classic test for reasonable apprehension of bias,66 and 
confirms that flexibility of approach is crucial in applying the test for 
bias in the context of administrative tribunals. In support, he quotes 
his argument from Committee for Justice & Liberty recommending an 
analysis that, in effect, amounts to a functional or contextual 
approach: 
... [T]he requirements of natural justice must depend upon the 
circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under 
which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt 
with, and so forth. 67 
From this Lamer CJ. concludes that the test should be applied in light 
of the functions being performed by the particular tribunal.68 The 
approach should also be flexible, determined by a ranking of the 
interests at stake. For example, security of the person matters dictate a 






Matsqui, supra note 5 at 37. Lamer C.J. bases this on decisions of the Federal 
Court of Appeal in MacBain v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), 
f 1985) l F.C. 856, 16 Admin. L.R. 109, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 119, 62 N.R. 117 (C.A.) 
[hereinafter MacBain], Sethi v. Canada (Minister of Employment & 
Immigration), [19881 2 F.C. 552, 31 Admin. L.R. 123, 52 D.L.R. (4th) 681, 87 
N.R. 389 (C.A.) [hereinafter Sethi] and Mohammad v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment & Immigration) (1988), [1989] 2 F.C. 363, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 91 
N.R. 121 (C.A.) [hereinafter Mohammad]. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 37. This reasoning is based on a consideration of 
Valente in Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 63 at 332 (per Gonthier J.). 
As set out by de Grandpre J. in Committee for Justice & liberty v. Canada 
(National Energy Board), [1978) 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 716, 9 N .. R. 
115 [hereinafter Committee for Justice & Liberty]. 
Ibid. at 395, quoting Tucker LJ. in Russell v. Duke of Nmfolk, [1949) 1 All E.R. 
109 at 118. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 39. Query how Lamer C.J. could conceivably reconcile 
this with his position as stated at 35 in Matsqui, quoted earlier in this section 
(notes 60-61 and accompanying text). He makes no attempt to do so. 
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tax assessment dictate something more flexible. The problem with this 
approach is that it sounds and feels very much - in fact exactly -
like the contextual approach Lamer CJ. has just denounced as 
inappropriate. 
Having established a set of ground rules, Lamer C.J. then 
derives the appropriate test to be applied in the current case: 
... The Valente principles must be considered in light of the nature of 
the appeal tribunals themselves, the interests at stake, and other 
indices of independence, in order to dete1mine whether a reasonable 
and right minded person, viewing the whole procedure as set out in 
the assessment by-laws, would have a reasonable apprehension of 
bias on the basis that the members of the appeal tribunals are not 
independent.69 [emphasis added] 
Lamer CJ. then compares the structure of the regulatory scheme with 
the factors delimiting institutional independence. He demonstrates that 
members of the appeal tribunals perform adjudicative functions not 
unlike those of courts. He observes that the language regarding 
remuneration is permissive, as members may receive remuneration but 
are not guaranteed a salary. Further, that payment might only be 
provided after a decision in a case. On the subject of security of 
tenure, Lamer C.J. interprets the by-laws as indicating that although 
appointments are to be made annually, the length of term is only 
presumptively one year. Matsqui members could be arbitrarily 
dismissed mid-term, and the Siska band could, if it wished, appoint 
tribunal members on an ad hoc basis or could refuse to re-appoint 
members who reached decisions contrary to the interests of the band. 
He expresses serious reservations on this issue, as the possibility that 
tribunal members may be removed from their position at any time is 
. 11 b 70 potentia y open to a use. 
Lamer CJ. poses his concern about the third Valente principle 
- administrative control - in terms of the selection procedure. Since 
the bands also select the members of the tribunals (in addition to 
controlling remuneration and tenure), there appears to be a 
dependency relationship between the tribunals and the bands. Added 
to this is the fact that a native band may be a party before a tribunal. 




Matsqui, ibid at 42. 
120 CDN. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE [11 C.J.A.L.P.] 
present their case before a tribunal whose memb~rs ar~ afipointed by 
the very band chiefs and councils who opp~se thelf cl_ai~1: To ~amer 
C.J., this raises a concern similar to the one m MacBazn, m which the 
prosecutor of human rights abuses also selected the members of the 
adjudicating panel. . 
The Matsqui band counter with two arguments, both of which 
are dismissed by Lamer C.J. First is the notion that an oath of 
impartiality will counterbalance any tendency t~ be biased. L~mer C.J. 
finds that though this may be a factor to take mto account, 1t cannot 
act as a substitute for financial security and security of tenure.
73 
The 
second argument relates to the comparative seriousness of the interest 
at stake - tax assessment - as compared to security of the person 
which was at issue in Sethi.74 Again, while Lamer C.J. notes that it is a 
consideration to take note of when applying the Valente principles, it 
is not convincing enough to enable him to discard these principles. He 
reiterates the point that the Valente principles, while flexible, cannot 
be ignored or discarded. . . . . 
Based on the foregoing, the Chief Justice fmds msuffic1ent 
independence. Emphasizing that it is the combined w~ight ?f the t~ree 
factors which produces his conclusion, Lamer C.J. fmds msuffic1ent 
institutional independence based on: 
( 1) complete absence of financial security for tribunal 
members, 
(2) complete absence (in the Siska Band) or ambiguit~ and 
thus inadequacy (in the Matsqui Band) of secunty of 
tenure, and 
(3) by virtue of the appointment process, detem1ination by 
tribunal members of the interests of their appointers. 
75 
He subsequently repeats that any one factor, taken in isolation, would 
not necessarily lead to the same conclusion, offering as a counter-






Matsqui, ibid at 43. 
Supra note 64. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 43. 
Supra note 64. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 43-44. 
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many of these fail to guarantee security of tenure or remuneration, 
they appear to address the administrative control factor by ensuring 
that appointments are made by a different level of government from 
those whose interests, in proceedings before them, are directly at 
stake.76 
In closing, Lamer C.J. attempts to clarify two issues. First, he 
recognizes that encouraging aboriginal self-government might 
preclude ceding appointment powers to the federal government. 
Bearing this in mind, he sets out examples of minimum requirements 
that would satisfy the need for sufficient institutional independence: 
the bands' by-laws must guarantee remuneration, stipulate periods of 
tenure, and restrict dismissal during tenure to dismissal for cause. The 
second point is that for the purposes of analyzing prematurity, Lamer 
C.J. differentiates between the concepts of institutional impartiality 
and institutional independence. While agreeing that allegations 
regarding impartiality are premature, since it is not possible to know 
in advance of a hearing what members think, Lamer C.J. asserts that 
this is not the case regarding independence. Independence and 
impartiality are distinct, and any inquiry on independence need solely 
examine the actual objective structure of the tribunal. In the latter 
case, according to Lamer C.J., it is sufficient to simply examine the 
by-laws and apply the Valente principles in order to reach a 
conclusion. The by-laws, in this analysis, become "conclusive 
evidence" of insufficient independence.77 
Finally, Lamer C.J. states his fundamental disagreement with 
Sopinka J. 's argument that institutional independence needs to be 
assessed in the context of an actual tribunal hearing. He characterizes 
Sopinka J.'s view as one interpreting the silence of the bylaws on 
tenure and remuneration as a discretion in the bands to implement 
their by-laws in a manner consistent with natural justice. This offends 
Lamer C.J.'s view of institutional independence, which functions to 
ensure that a tribunal is legally structured so that its members are 
reasonably independent of those who appoint them. Moreover, 
institutional independence ensures that tribunal independence is not 
left to the discretion of those who appoint the tribunals. If institutional 
independence exists, according to Lamer C.J., it must be located in the 
76 
77 
Matsqui, ibid at 44. 
Matsqui, ibid at 45. 
122 CDN. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE [11 C.J.A.L.P.] 
empowering bylaws; achieving it by a hopeful exercise of discretion is 
·11 78 1 usory. 
(ii) The Reasoning of Sopinka J. 
Sopinka J. and Lamer C.J. are m agreement regarding all 
issues concerning bias with the exception of institutional 
independence. Sopinka J. also follows the same four-step process 
employed by Lamer C.J. But it is the final two where their analyses 
diverge: the relevance of the context of Aboriginal self-government as 
it relates to institutional independence, and the need for courts to 
consider the practice of the tribunal as depicted in the context of an 
actual hearing. 
A. The Importance of Context in a Case Dealing with Natives 
Underlying all of Sopinka J.'s analysis is a heavy reliance on 
the need to evaluate independence in context. He begins by noting that 
Lamer C.J. recognizes the importance of context in applying Valente: 
the essential conditions of institutional independence .. .in the judicial 
context need not be applied with the same strictness in the case of 
administrative tribunals. Conditions of institutional independence 
must take into account their context.19 [emphasis in the original] 
The primary contextual factor in this case, considered and relied upon 
by Joyal J. at first instance, is the importance of nurturing native self-
government initiatives, here seen through the taxation regimes.80 Given 
the broad, general interpretive principles developed in previous 





Matsqui, ibid at 46. 
Matsqui, ibid, at 48-49. 
No direct connection is made (nor, presumably, intended) between the objective 
of empowering native self-government and the specific structure given the 
tribunals in the by-laws. Although arguably the structure arose more out of the 
presumed part-time, occasional nature of their task, N. Des Rosiers, in her 
presentation to the Federal Court members (see note 138, infra) implies a more 
direct connection. 
Sopinka J. makes reference to the cases of Nowegijick v. R., [ 1983] l S.C.R. 29 at 
36, (1983] 2 C.N.L.R. 89, (1983] C.T.C. 20, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193, and Mitchell v. 
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toward maintammg aboriginal rights, Sopinka J. insists that any 
assessment of institutional independence based solely on the bare 
wording of the by-laws themselves, without full regard given to their 
context, and thus their practical application, is incomplete.82 
B. The Importance of Tribunal Practice as Relevant Context 
While fully agreeing with Lamer C.J. that a tribunal must 
comply with the principles of natural justice, the essential question for 
Sopinka J. is what relevant information must the reasonable and right-
minded person be expected to know, or discover, in order to 
sufficiently determine whether there is a reasonable apprehension of 
bias in a tribunal. Where Lamer C.J. would limit the information to the 
procedure set out in the by-laws, Sopinka J. would expand this 
information to knowledge of how the tribunal operates in actual 
practice. Assessing compliance with the principles of natural justice 
cannot be made, according to Sopinka J., absent a clear understanding 
of the relevant and operational context.83 Sopinka J. supports this 
contention by drawing on Committee for Justice & Liherty.84 There, de 
Grandpre J. held that the relevant context for analysis of natural 
justice could include "the circumstances of the case, the nature of the 
inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter 
that is being dealt with, and so forth."85 For Sopinka J., this approach 
should be employed in determining both institutional independence 
and institutional impartiality. 
Sopinka J. supports his thesis first with a number of cases 
concerning institutional impartiality in which context was 
considered,86 asserting that their relevance rests on a minimal 





Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 143, [1990] 5 W.W.R. 97, [1990] 3 
C.N.L.R. 46, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 67 Man. R. (2d) 81. 
See Matsqui, supra note 5 at 50. 
See Matsqui, ibid at 51. 
Supra note 66. 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 51, citing Committee for Justice & Liberty, ibid. at 395. 
Lippe, supra note 52 (context of steps taken by part-time judges to render 
themselves impartial overcomes perception of bias); Pearlman, supra note 56 
(wider context of Aci and experience overcomes perception of bias). 
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the administrative context.87 He follows by citing a number of cases 
where a tribunal's actual practice was used to assess institutional 
independence.
88 
On the basis of this case law, he draws the conclusion 
that the institutional bias question has, in general, been considered 
after the tribunal has been appointed and/or actually rendered 
judgment, and that considering contextual facts does not fall outside 
an "objective" consideration of institutional independence.89 
At the core of Sopinka J.'s reasoning is how to treat by-laws 
which are silent with regard to factors relevant to the Valente 
principles. When such factors are only vaguely or partly set out (or not 
at all), Sopinka J. concludes that it is not safe to form conclusions 
about the institution on the wording of the by-laws alone. He feels that 
the objective consideration requires, in the face of "missing" elements, 
a context "enriched" by "knowledge of the operational reality.'"'0 As 
no panel had been appointed in this instance, it is Sopinka J.'s 
contention that the missing elements may have been satisfactorily 
addressed upon appointment. On this basis he holds that Joyal J. 
properly exercised his discretion at first instance and properly 
considered that the issue of bias was premature.91 
4. EXPLORING THE VALUE OF MATSQUI 
The essential controversy between Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. 
in Matsqui on the question of institutional independence can be 
reduced to two central, related, issues: 
87 





Alex Couture Inc. v. Canada (Procureur general) (1991), 83 D.L.R. (4th) 577 38 
C.P.R. (3d) 293, 41 Q.A.C. 1, [1991] R.J.Q. 2534 (C.A.) leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. refused (1992), 91 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note), 42 C.P.R. (3d) v (note) (actual 
appointment terms and general government policy on remuneration of tribunal 
members considered in addition to the statutory scheme on its face); MacBain, 
supra note 64 (the scheme of both the legislation and how the legislation 
operated in practice considered); Mohammad, supra note 64 (range of operational 
factors considered in determining independence of immigration adjudicators). 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 52-53. 
Matsqui, ibid at 53. 
See Matsqui, ibid at 53. 
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1. In examining an administrative tribunal for reasonable 
apprehension of bias based on lack of sufficient 
institutional independence, what are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of knowledge required of the 
hypothetical "reasonable and right-minded person"? Does 
an "objective" assessment consist solely of an 
examination of the relevant legislation, or should/must it 
also include consideration of the "operational context"? 
2. What is the appropriate treatment of empowering 
legislation which is silent, vague, or incomplete with 
regard to the three principles set out in Valente? 
On both of these issues, the two justices seriously disagree. Lamer CJ. 
holds that the reasonable and right-minded person need only look to 
the wording of the empowering legislation in order to be sufficiently 
informed, and that silent, vague or incomplete empowering legislation 
must be cured by the imposition of sufficient guarantees to satisfy a 
minimum standard of independence. Sopinka J. holds that the 
reasonable and right-minded person must look beyond the bare 
wording of the legislation to the operational context or risk making an 
uninformed decision, and that the operational, contextual approach is 
even more necessary in the face of silent, vague or incomplete 
empowering legislation. 
While stressing the flexible application of Valente principles 
in an administrative context, and employing a purposive approach for 
much of the judgment, Lamer CJ. delivers in the end a purely 
formalist, determinist answer on the issue of institutional 
independence. Sopinka J., on the other hand, agrees in principle with 
much of Lamer C.J.'s reasoning, but instead of holding back and 
making artificial distinctions between impartiality and independence, 
insists on imposing the contextual approach to the issue of 
institutional independence as well. 
Two things stand out about the judgment of Lamer CJ. The 
first is that institutional independence assumes, by the end of his 
reasons, the weight of a fully-fledged common-law doctrine setting 
out the minimum conditions required to prevent a reasonable 
apprehension of bias on the basis of a lack of independence.92 
Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that such a common law 
92 
Matsqui, ibid at 44-45. 
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doctrine need necessarily arise from the principles enunciated in 
Valente, or if it does, that it need necessarily take the explicit fo1m 





a~d of themselves beco~e. con.clu.s1~e 
evidence of independence, 1s adequate for estabhshmg Judicial 
standards of review. The second point to note is that Lamer CJ. 
reduces the analysis necessary for finding reasonable apprehension of 
bias to a mechanistic exercise. To him, applying the Valente principles 
to the wording of legislation allows one to come to a conclusion on the 
issue. However, one must ask, what exactly are the flexible principles 
(as both Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J. grant that Valente provides, even 
in the administrative arena) if one applies the Valente principles 
mechanistically to the wording of the legislation? In other words, can 
a flexible set of criteria ever be applied to specific wording without 
generating many, differentiated, conclusions? 
As Sopinka J. observes, the problem is that the legislation may 
be silent, vague, or incomplete in its attention to the Valente criteria. 
In the face of silence, Lamer C.J. demands explicit remediation by 
adding specific reference to security of tenure and remuneration and 
administrative control; in the face of that same silence, Sopinka J. 
looks for operational, contextual details of the tribunal in action in 
order to examine its independence. 
The next section looks at the reasoning in more detail, 
showing where the justices agree, disagree and where they failed to 
consider the issues at all. We then explore the new "doctrine" of 
institutional independence developed in Matsqui, and speculate as to 
how this decision may play out in the future. 
(a) The Reasoning on Independence 
(i) Common Ground 
Much of the common ground in the respective analyses of 
Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J. is implicit, in that Sopinka J. opens his 
analysis with the statement that he is in agreement with the Chief 
Justice on all issues with the exception of his position on institutional 
93 
See Matsqui, ibid at 43. 
See Matsqui, ibid at 45. 
INDEPENDENCE AFTER MATSQUI? 127 
independence.95 Although it must be remarked that all the reasoning 
regarding independence is technically obiter, areas in which Lamer 
CJ. and Sopinka J. agree can be considered quite significant, in that 
they carry the weight of six of the nine judges of the Court. 
Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. agree that s. l l (d) of the Charter, 
while not applying directly to administrative tribunals, is relevant to 
some degree in examining bias. This is based on the Valente case, 
which acts as a guide in applying s. I I (d) to cases of bias, impartiality 
and independence in a tribunal. Moreover, the essential conditions of 
independence, as laid out in Valente in the judicial context, must be 
applied flexibly and in a manner sensitive to the context in the case of 
administrative tribunals.96 Both justices also implicitly agree that 
individual and institutional impartiality and independence are all 
separable components of a test for apprehension of bias, and may be 
analyzed separately. 
Both justices allude to the need to examine each case on its 
own merits, and at the appropriate time. They implicitly recognize that 
the requisite level of independence will vary with the importance of 
the rights of the parties that are at stake and that allegations of 
apprehension of bias based on lack of impartiality are speculative 
prior to establishing a tribuna1.97 The test to be applied in cases of 
impartiality is that for bias the "reasonable, right-minded person" 
test - and the test for institutional impartiality - will there be a 
perception in a substantial number of cases? developed by Lamer 
C.J. in Lippe. This functional approach acknowledges that context 
plays a relevant and necessary factor in the analysis.98 
Most interesting of all, both justices consider institutional 






My colleague Sopinka J. does not dispute that institutional 
independence is a principle of natural justice which applies to the 
band tribunals99 
Matsqui, ibid at 47. 
Matsqui, ibid, Lamer C.J. at 31, Sopinka J. at 48. 
Matsqui, ibid, Lamer C.J. at 32, Sopinka J. at 53. 
Matsqui, ibid, note 5, Lamer C.J. at 33-34, Sopinka J. at 5 l. Based on Iacobucci 
J.'s approach developed in Pearlman, supra note 56. 
Matsqui, supra, note 5, at 45. 
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and, although somewhat more ambiguous, Sopinka J. states: 
I do not disagree with the Chief Justice that the band taxation 
tribunals must comply with the principles of natural justice.100 
Support by a clear majority of the court for the following propositions 
heralds a doctrinal great leap forward: agreement that independence 
and impartiality are recognizable as clearly-delineated, separable 
components of the general test for bias; the clear recognition of 
autonomous institutional analogues capable of independent testing; 
and the arguably implicit recognition of institutional independence as 
a common law principle of natural justice. However, it is the 
fundamental disagreement between Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J. on what 
they see - or should see - once they arrive at that common ground, 
that becomes the focus of the analysis. 
(ii) World's Apart 
Whereas much of the agreement in the two sets of reasons is 
implicit, in the end the disagreements between Lamer CJ. and 
Sopinka J. are loud, firm, and explicit. Having travelled much of the 
way together and having forged a new path toward an analysis of 
structural independence, on arrival the two justices disagree not just 
on what it is they see, but on how to look at it. 
Lamer CJ. 's position is based on a number of tenets, most of 
which are the result of a formalistic examination of the by-law and a 
retreat from his position on context. In his view, a purposive 
examination of context is not relevant to the question of reasonable 
apprehension of bias at an institutional level, 101 since consideration of 
context in an institutional setting will "dilute natural justice."102 
Instead, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable and right-minded 
person, viewing the whole procedure as set out in the assessment by-
laws, would have a reasonable apprehension of bias on the basis that 
the members are not independent. 103 
JOO 
Matsqui, ibid at 51. 
IOI 
Matsqui, ibid at 35. 
102 
Matsqui, ibid at 32. 
103 
Matsqui, ibid at 39. 
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Examining the by-law in this instance leads Lamer C.J. to spot 
evidence of bias. For one, the appointing bodies may appear later as 
parties to an appeal, and are thus opposed in interest to other parties 
who appear before the tribunaI.104 Secondly, giving weight to an oath 
of impartiality in the absence of explicit guarantees of remuneration 
and security of tenure, and attempting to weigh the relative property 
interests versus security of the person interests, ignores the Valente 
principles. 105 Lamer CJ.'s solution to this is that the third Valente 
principle, administrative control, is normally addressed by 
appointment powers being placed in a different level of government. If 
the purpose of the legislation makes this undesirable, legislation must 
include explicit guarantees of remuneration, periods of tenure, and 
removal of members only for cause. 
In answer to the concerns about the inquiry being premature, 
Lamer CJ. holds that an objective inquiry focused on the actual 
structure of a tribunal can be made prior to the formation of the 
tribunal. Again, he returns to the empowering by-laws. By applying 
the Valente principles, one can determine conclusively, in isolation, 
without benefit of a hearing, whether bias exists. Even silence in 
empowering legislation constitutes a discretion in the appointing body 
to ensure (or not ensure) sufficient institutional independence, which 
discretion is itself violative of the "institutional independence 
doctrine. " 106 
As mentioned previously, Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. do not 
disagree on the fundamental issues. Sopinka J. restricts his overt 
disagreement with Lamer C.J. to a handful of points. His first concern 
is the use of context. Sopinka J. states that context must be looked at 
in cases of institutional independence because it is relevant and 
necessary. This is especially true when one is basing a decision on the 
principles of natural justice, which cannot be applied in the absence of 
a clear understanding of the relevant, operational context of a tribunal, 
and as borne out by previous case law. 107 
104 
Matsqui, ibid at 43. This is an implicit disagreement with Sopinka J., who makes 
the point that it is premature - see Matsqui at 53. 
Ills Matsqui, ibid at 43. 
106 
Matsqui, ibid at 45. 
!0
7 
Matsqui, ibid at 50-52. 
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Sopinka J. then addresses both the matter of prematurity and 
the idea of reviewing by-laws raised by Lamer C.J. He argues that any 
decision regarding institutional bias based on insufficient institutional 
independence is premature if it occurs before a tribunal has been 
formed, as there has been no chance to observe the tribunal operating 
in practice. Presumably, Sopinka J. is placing weight on the need to 
see the actual terms of appointment and how they may spell out 
provisions relating to the duration of appointment, dismissability and 
remuneration. For him the proper place for considering the 
institutional bias question in general is after the tribunal has been 
appointed and/or rendered judgment, particularly when the 
empowering legislation is silent, vague or incomplete in terms of the 
Valente principles. ios More generally, he notes difficulties inherent 
with Lamer C.J.'s formalistic approach, showing how focussing on 
legislative wording is inadequate. The approach also violates the 
necessity for flexibility in applying the Valente principles to the 
administrative context, at least when the legislation is silent on the 
. " d" . 109 Issue, or con1ers iscret10n. 
It is important to note two things about the justices' 
disagreement. First, prior to venturing out on the independence 
"limb," they are both in essential agreement on all aspects of the test 
for apprehension of bias. This includes the first limb, impartiality, and 
the need for flexibility and attention to context when applying the 
Valente principles. Second, on institutional independence, Lamer 
C.J. 's position becomes strictly formalist, whereas Sopinka J.'s 
position remains contextualist. 
(iii)Areas of Silence 
While it is important that judges, in general, should confine 
themselves as much as possible to the issues before the court, it is 
arguably equally important that if an issue is judged relevant and is 
dealt with - whether dispositive or not - it is incumbent on the 
judges of our highest court to be mindful that their reasoning carries 
108 • h Matsqui, ibid at 53. Although the argument has merit after appointment, t e 
109 
suggestion that one should wait until after a case has been decided to determine 
bias is highly dubious. 
Matsqui, ibid at 50. 
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weight in future cases. In areas of unsettled or unclear law, Supreme 
Court obiter can be useful in providing guidance, or it can obfuscate 
and sow further confusion. Therefore, if a decision is offered, the 
reasoning should be carried out in a sufficiently comprehensive 
manner and with attention to the core areas needing treatment. 
In this regard, it is possible that Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. 
failed to pay adequate attention to the ramifications of the way in 
which they play out their disagreement. Two significant factors are 
either ignored or insufficiently treated. , 
The first factor is the widely-recognized complex typology of 
administrative agencies, 110 on which both justices are silent. In 
Matsqui, the tribunals were established by subordinate legislatio~ 
equivalent to regulation. The question is left untreated whe.ther, and, If 
so how the reasoning on institutional independence will apply to 
tribunal; established directly by statute, given the fact of legislative 
supremacy and the presumption of constitutionality. No attempt is 
made in the judgment to anchor "independence" firmly in a general 
legal framework - either statutory or constitutional. 
The second factor is the role played by the Constitution and/or 
the Charter, which is insufficiently treated in the reasoning in 
Matsqui. Although s. 1 I (d) of the Charter is used to build t~e stand~rd 
basis for the Valente principles, and Lamer C.J. makes bnef mention 
of "security of the person" in contrast with "lesser interests" (without 
making explicit reference to s.7),
111 
the w.ay in ~hic.h .such 
considerations should inform the analysis of mstitut1onal 
independence is left open. Further, adopting an inflexibl~, formalist 
approach, where purely economic interests of a corporat10n were at 
stake, leaves open the question of what further imposition of Charter 
standards would be possible in a case in which clearer personal 
interests were at issue. In terms of the Constitution itself, as above, no 
mention is made of any possible relevance of the subordinate nature of 
the pertinent legislation. 
The net result of such lacunae in analysis is either to leave the 
decision-makers below to "tack on" their own reasoning with regard to 
those issues or to mistake the reasoning here as complete, when it is 
not. In some instances this may not be important. In other cases, it 
110 Recognized throughout the many studies and reports mentioned in Part 2 of this 
paper. 
111 
See Matsqui, supra note 5 at 31. 
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may be crucial. Either way, it is now unclear, after Lamer C.J.'s 
decision, what role context plays in. institutional bias cases. It is this 
failure of the Court to carefully explore the implications of its reasons 
to which we now turn. 
(b) The New "Doctrine" of Institutional Independence 
. . Any critique of the "doctrine" of institutional independence 
an~mg fr~m Matsqui must focus on Lamer C.J. 's reasoning. It is the 
Ch1e_f Justice who has supplied the major pai1 of the prior reasoning in 
previous cases on this subject, as he implicitly recognizes by citing 
?imself in Lippe and Genereux. Sopinka J.'s reasoning on the issue is, 
m essence, purely reactive to, and arises from his disagreement with, 
Lamer C.J.'s analysis. But Lamer C.J.'s approach to the treatment of 
empowering legislation that is silent, vague or incomplete with regard 
to the Valente criteria of tenure, remuneration and administrative 
control is inadequate. There are at least six weaknesses in Lamer 
C.J.'s reasoning that undermine this new test for reasonable 
apprehension of bias. Sopinka J. 's reply also falls short in a number of 
areas. 
(i) Lamer C.J.' s Six Pitfalls 
First off, Lamer C.J. argues that while context is important for 
deciding ~ndividual impartiality, it is irrelevant when considering 
structural mdependence. This is at once contradictory, because he also 
acknowledges how the nature of the tribunal itself is important. 112 In 
any event, when he does go on to ignore context by restricting the 
rele~ant i~formation to the bare wording of the by-law, he not only 
acts mflex1bly, but arbitrarily. Flexibility based upon considerations of 
whether a tribunal is adjudicative, policy-making, or mixed must 
surely go beyond the bare wording of the by-law. His attempt to 
sufficiently differentiate "bias" from "institutional independence" in 
order to abandon notions of context and function is hindered by 
repeated conflation of the two terms. 
Second, Lamer C.J. has an easy time dismissing allegations 
regarding the impartiality of band members as speculative because 
112 
See arguments at Part 3, sections (c)(i) B. and C. 
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C.P. had not applied to the appeal tribunals, and the band members 
were not appointed. 113 But his approach is different when the issue of 
institutional impartiality arises. The combined silence, vagueness and 
incompleteness of the by-laws on a number of factors pertinent to the 
Valente principles of judicial independence become conclusive 
evidence of the tribunals' insufficient independence. 114 Lamer C.J. 
substantiates his conclusion by cataloguing those things which might 






members might not be paid 
members might be dismissed mid-term or at any time 
members might be paid only after a decision 
members might be appointed ad hoc for no particular term 
members making a wrong decision might not be 
reappointed. 115 
But as Sopinka J. is at pains to point out, the opposite could also be 
true. Sometimes waiting and seeing may be perfectly fair and 
unbiased. 116 As with the arbitrary restriction of the question of bias to 
the wording of the by-law, the sudden switch from the use of 
speculation as a reason not to draw a conclusion on impartiality, to 
using it to draw a negative conclusion on independence, is 
disconcerting. 
Third, that the by-laws indicate both self-selection of 
members, and control of remuneration and tenure produces, in Lamer 
C.J.'s view, an appearance of dependency between the tribunal and the 
band. Here is a clear manifestation of the contextual approach that 
Lamer C.J. insisted would not be applicable in his institutional 
independence analysis. The possibility for cases appearing before the 
tribunal in which a particular band does not appear is given no weight 
in the analysis. Were the by-laws to set out that the bands were to be a 
party to every appeal, Lamer C.J. would have more to work with. And 
his prescriptiv~ cure - guarantees of remuneration and tenure with 
113 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32. 
114 
Matsqui, ibid, at 45. 
115 
Matsqui, ibid at 42 (emphasis added). 
116 
Matsqui, ibid at 53. 
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dismissal only for cause, with no mention of the third Valente 
principle 117 - downplays the problem he previously identifies, and 
remains arbitrary. 
Fourth, the simplicity of the test offered by Lamer C.J. -
application of the Valente principles to the tax appeal tribunal's by-
laws is deceptive. The principles in Valente were developed in the 
context of a criminal case, directly involving interpretation of the 
content of the protections afforded the judiciary under ss. 96-101 of 
the Constitution, in conjunction with the protections afforded an 
accused under s. 11 (d) of the Charter. Lamer C.J. merely asserts that 
Valente provides guidance in assessing tribunal independence. Then 
he notes that the Federal Court of Appeal applied the Valente 
principles to administrative tribunals in a number of cases. 118 However, 
he fails to indicate (although Sopinka J. in response does 119) that all 
these cases were brought after a tribunal rendered a decision, that they 
may not be authority for using Valente's s. l l(d) concerns in an 
administrative context120 and of these cases, two relied on context 
anyway. Taken together, it is questionable whether the cases should be 
used as bare authority for the application of these principles to the 
administrative context. But Lamer C.J. continues by asserting that it is 
a principle of natural justice that a party before an adjudicative 
tribunal should receive a hearing which is not only independent, but 
also appears independent. 121 He again reiterates the idea of flexibility 
recommended by de Grandpre J. in Committee for Justice & Liberty, 122 
but he demonstrates this by limiting the test to a review of the 
assessment by-laws. 123 The dictates of natural justice, according to 
Lamer C.J.'s reading of them, provide little room for flexibility after 
all, at least in the area of institutional independence. 
117 
Matsqui, ibid at 44-45. 
118 
See the cases of MacBain, Sethi, Mohammad, supra note 64. 
119 
See section (ii) of this Pru·t 4(b), infra. 
i:?o Sethi and Mohammad, supra note 64, as immigration cases, stand a much higher 
chance of involving some degree of concern over s. 7 ( security of the person). 
Regardless, both results upheld the sufficiency of independence of the 
immigration board and adjudicators, respectively. 
121 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 37. 
122 
Supra, note 66. 
123 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 39. 
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Fifth, Lamer C.J. generates from his analysis a number of 
formalist conclusions. All seem the product of, at best, inadequate 
foundational reasoning. Oaths of impartiality in office are dismissed 
as an insufficient substitute for financial security or security of tenure 
in assessing the institutional independence of a tribunal. This is based 
on Lamer C.J.'s conflation of the indicia of individual impartiality 
with that of institutional independence, two concepts he had earlier 
carefully segregated. Ignoring the different weight that should be 
ascribed to property interests relative to security of the person interests 
points out the problem of refusing to frame an analysis in terms of the 
Bill of Rights 124 or the Charter. 125 And, due to his equivocation on the 
three factors of financial security, security of tenure and interested 
party adjudication, a tribunal's by-laws could reflect any one of five 
permutations to escape from a finding of insufficient institutional 
independence. 126 In effect, Lamer C.J. specifies a doctrine that can be 
satisfied, minimally, in one of two ways. Either a statute should 
specify security of remuneration and tenure, or it should specify 
appointment by another level of government. If this is indeed what he 
meant it is unfortunate it was not stated more clearly. Further, to 
coher~ with his own prescriptive finding, it is also necessary for an 
empowering statute to explicitly forbid the appearance of the 
different-level appointing body before the tribunal. If a statute 
allowed, or was silent, on the right of the appointing body to appear, 
the appointing province might appear before the tribunal, which by 
Lamer C.J.'s own prior reasoning, should result in a finding of 
insufficient institutional independence. 
Finally, the reductivist techniques employed by Lamer C.J. in 
his formalist analysis, enable him to define the institutional 
independence doctrine in deceptively simplistic methodological terms: 
"We can examine the by-laws, apply the Valente principles, and reach 
a conclusion."127 The function of this objective entity, institutional 
124 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44. Sees. l(a). 
125 
Supra, note 45, s. 7. 
126 The possibilities are: (i) security of tenure, security of remuneration and 
appointment by a different level of government; (ii) appointment by a different 
level of government; (iii) security of tenure and appointment by a different level; 
(iv) security of remuneration and appointment by a different level; and (v) 
security of tenure and security of remuneration. 
127 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 45. 
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independence, which Lamer CJ. has promoted to a principle of natural 
justice, is simple as well: "to ensure that a tribunal is legally 
structured such that its members are reasonably independent of those 
who appoint them." 128 There is no need for "reasonable apprehension" 
in the rewritten test, as the wording will either pass muster or will not. 
By-laws that fail on this analysis will violate principles of natural 
justice. Viewed in this way, the concept of institutional independence 
becomes, in effect, nothing more than a legislative drafting guideline, 
ensuring adequate legal structure. The end result is too simplistic for 
Sopinka J. 
(ii) Sopinka J.' s Rejoinder 
In contrast to the Chief Justice, Sopinka J. (with whom three 
justices concur) does not range broadly over the topic, but narrows his 
focus to the core of their disagreement - the role of context in an 
analysis of institutional independence. Specifically, Sopinka J. looks 
at the content of the term when applying the test for the apprehension 
of bias as set out in Committee for Justice & Liberty. 129 Lamer C.J.'s 
failure to give appropriate attention to context is the basis of Sopinka 
J. 's conclusion that restricting the institutional independence test to 
the text of a by-law will leave the right-minded person uninformed. 
Given the fact that at the time of the appeal no panel had been 
appointed, nor any tenns of tenure or remuneration set, Sopinka J. 
argues that no decision on institutional independence could, or should, 
be made. 130 
Two flaws make Sopinka J.'s analysis and critique of Lamer 
CJ.' s reasoning less useful than it might otherwise have been. The 
first flaw is his failure to elaborate on a major conceptual difference 
with Lamer C.J. The second flaw, which pervades much of his 
reasoning, is an inability or unwillingness to provide a solid definition 
of "context." 
Buried between paragraphs providing illustrations of cases 
dealing with institutional impartiality and institutional independence, 
Sopinka J. makes the following general statement: 
128 
Matsqui, ibid at 45. 
129 
Supra, note 66 at 394-395. 
130 
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 53. 
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... the relationship between impartiality and independence, even in the 
traditional judicial context, is a close one .... The significance of the 
theoretical distinction would appear to hold still less weight in the 
administrative tribunals context. 131 
Inexplicably, Sopinka J. fails to indicate that with this observation, 
which he draws from Valente, 132 he is implicitly taking issue with the 
foundation upon which Lamer C.J. has built his theory of a virtually-
autonomous "institutional independence doctrine," as well as with 
much of Lamer C.J.'s earlier attempts to separate the two concepts as 
founded in Lippe and Genereux. 133 The casual treatment of what 
should be a fully-developed foundational argument is unfortunate. 
Moreover, despite the fact that context is the concept central 
to his analysis, Sopinka J. fails throughout to provide a single, 
consistent definition of what the term means. Rather, a catalogue of a 
dozen slightly-variant "definitions" and illustrations from cases are 
supplied within four pages. 134 Thus, although context plays a central 
role for Sopinka J. in determining whether there is a reasonable 
apprehension of bias on the basis of insufficient institutional 
131 
Matsqui, ibid at 52. 
132 
Supra note 44 at 685. 
133 
Both cited as earlier authority by Lamer C.J. in support of his culminating total 
separation of the two concepts in Matsqui. See notes 48-54 and accompanying 
text. 
134 
See Matsqui, supra note 5 at 50-53. From Sopinka J.'s decision in Matsqui, we 
learn that context, for example, might include how a tribunal operates in actual 
practice (at 50); its contextual setting (at 50); the relevant, operational context (at 
51); the actual context and operation of the office (at 51); the wider context 
provided by a governing Act and the experience of self-governing professions 
generally (at 51); the context of an actual hearing (at 52); the statutory scheme on 
its face (at 52); the actual appointment terms, financial security and connection to 
the executive branch of government for each of the individual lay members (at 
52); the administrative policy respecting remuneration of tribunal members (at 
52); whether a tribunal is actually constituted and the procedure of short listing 
prospective tribunal members (at 52); the importance of both the scheme of the 
legislation and how that legislation operated in practice (at 52); a range of 
operational facts and circumstances including: the chain of command from the 
Minister to the actual adjudicator, legal direction, monitoring, security of tenure, 
the collective bargaining unit, transfer arrangements and scheduling of cases (at 
53); knowledge of the operational reality of elements such as security of tenure 
and remuneration that may be missing (at 53); and the practice of a tribunal as 
depicted in the context of an actual hearing (at 53). 
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independence, it remains an elusive tem1, susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. It clearly widens the objective knowledge required 
beyond the limitation imposed by Lamer C.J. However, the excessive 
detail contained within Sopinka J.'s list makes it difficult to set a 
standard. In the end, one does not have much confidence that a 
hypothetical person, or for that matter, a decision-making body, has 
sufficient information to ascertain a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
(c) The Utility of the Reasoning in Matsqui: Will it Work 
as an Analytical Tool? 
The most cogent criticism of the reasoning of both Lamer CJ. 
and Sopinka J. is that each fails to answer important questions. For 
instance, with whom should we side when faced with an empowering 
statute which is silent, incomplete or ambiguous in te1ms of the 
Valente criteria? On the one hand, Lamer C.J. offers a fom1alist 
method of analysis which is exceptionally easy to apply at a very early 
stage, yet potentially fatal to the very existence of a number of 
agencies. On the other hand, Sopinka J. offers a contextualist mode of 
analysis which may allow a potentially flawed tribunal to make 
decisions, before being challengeable on grounds of independence. 
But he leaves one unsure of what context really is. Neither alternative 
comforts. 
The lack of any serious consideration of the remedial aspect of 
their findings hobbles the reasoning of both Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J. 
Arguably, this is due to their dealing with an issue which was not 
considered in any depth in the courts below, and which was tangential 
to the deciding issue in the result. However, the truncation of the two 
justices' considerations may be particularly problematic if one is 
looking to Matsqui for guidance. 
In dealing with a tribunal established by subordinate 
legislation, Lamer CJ. was, technically, justified in limiting his attack 
to the principles of natural justice. No consideration was given in his 
reasons, however, to how the fundamental tenets of legislative 
supremacy and the presumption of constitutionality might impact on 
tribunals established directly by statute. Arguably there was no need 
for the Chief Justice to consider that. As he was willing to extend 
himself as far into theory as he did, however, it should be incumbent 
on him at least to indicate he was aware of a potential problem. In 
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view of the fact that he did not, and his consequently incomplete 
"general field theory" of institutional independence, it might be best to 
"read down" his statements in Matsqui. Perhaps they are best seen as 
very strong recommendations on how the Valente principles of 
judicial independence must find expression in subordinate legislation 
establishing adjudicative tribunals. Meanwhile, the question of how to 
h .b I . d 135 apply the t eory to statutory tn una s must remam unanswere . 
Constitutionally, the reasons of both justices seem oddly 
adrift. Neither analysis is grounded in the Constitution, the Charter, or 
the Bill of Rights, thereby providing no indication how - or whether 
- these texts might speak further to the issue of institutional 
independence. Once again, it might be argued that it was unnecessary 
to do so in this case. But by using s. 11 ( d) of the Charter to introduce 
the Valente principles, and obliquely alluding to security of the person, 
Lamer CJ. left room for development. There was a missed 
opportunity to characterize the interest at stake as either "the 
enjoyment of property" or "the determination of rights and 
obligations" as provided for in the Bill of Rights. 136 
Still, there are a number of issues relating to bias on which a 
clear majority of the Supreme Court agree. 137 It is possible that, in 
isolation, none of the above comments necessarily restrict Matsqui 
from providing some guidance on the issue of tribunal independence. 
But in view of the mutually contradictory positions developed by 
Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J., the value of the case as a source for 
understanding the nature of institutional independence must be 
questioned. 
The polls are obviously still open regarding Matsqui' s role on 
the subject of institutional independence. No commentator has 
sufficiently stressed the frustrating disutility of the standard set by 
Lamer CJ.; nor has the paralysing nature of the disagreement between 
Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. been observed. 138 A trend common to the 
135 
Although, it seems that the analysis is performed in exactly the same fashion 
- see Regie des pennis d' a/cool, supra note 36. The judgment was silent on 
the question of whether there are any analytical differences between the two. 
136 
Sections l(a) and 2(e), respectively, of the Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note 
124. 
137 
See Part 4, section (a)(i) of this paper, supra. 
138 
See P. L. Bryden, supra note 34 at 27-33 passim, 49-60; D.J. Mullan, 
Administrative Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) (also Volume 3 of the Canadian 
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academic commentary to date is either to treat the judgments in 
Matsqui as unitary (effectively as the pronouncement of Lamer C.J.) 
and incorporate them into the canon of administrative law, 139 or view 
them as a set of positions from which one can draw what one wills. 140 
Similarly, of two cases subsequent to Matsqui that employ its 
reasoning, Katz1
41 
effectively ignores the difference between Lamer 
C.J. and Sopinka J.'s approach, though opting in the end for Sopinka 
J.'s, while Bissett142 just opts for Sopinka J.'s approach without much 
explanation. 
These cases, concerning a provincial securities regulation 
regime, and the federal labour regime respectively, are examined in 
more detail below. 
(i) Katz v. Vancouver Stock Exchange 
The case involved a challenge to the disciplinary process set 
out in the by-laws of the Vancouver Stock Exchange, authorized by 
two British Columbia statutes, the Securities Ad43 and the Vancouver 
Stock Exchange Act.
144 
Katz and others were charged with violating 
provisions of the bylaws and Exchange rules. After a panel was 





Encyclopedic Digest series); and N. Des Rosiers, "Independence and impartiality 
of administrative tribunals: Lessons in Listening" (Presentation to the members of 
the Federal Court, September 1996 [unpublished on file with the authors]. Also, a 
source that may be helpful but was unavailable at the time of writing is D. Ginn, 
"Recent Developments in Impartiality and Independence" (1997) 11 C.J.A.L.P. 
25. 
See Bryden and Des Rosiers, ibid. 
See Mullan, Administrative Law, supra note 139 at 218. 
Kat:: v. Vancouver Stock Exchange (1995), 128 D.L.R. (4th) 424, 14 B.C.L.R. 
(3d) 66, 34 Admin. L.R. (2d) !., [ 1996] 2 W.W.R. 356 (C.A. per curiam). Appeal 
to the SCC denied, see [1996] 3 S.C.R. 405, 41 Admin. L.R. (2d) l, 139 D.L.R. 
(4th) 575, 207 N.R. 72. 
Bissett \'. Canada (Minister of Labour), [1995] 3 F.C. 762, 102 F.T.R. 172 
(T.D.). Reference can also be made to Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. 
Canada (labour Relations Board), [1996] 3 F.C. 609, 41 Admin. L.R. (2d) 49, 
118 F.T.R. l (T.D.). 
143 
S.B.C. 1985, c. 83. 
144 
S.B.C. 1907, c. 62, as amended. 
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inquiry into allegations of contraventions of by-laws and Exchange 
rules, but prior to the inquiry itself, the defendants requested a hearing 
and review by the B.C. Securities Commission,145 alleging lack of 
institutional independence in the hearing panel. The Commission 
rejected the argument of reasonable apprehension of bias, as did the 
B.C. Court of Appeal. The appellant, Katz, relied primarily upon 
Lamer C.J.'s holding in Matsqui in both fora, but at the Court of 
Appeal, chose to allege a lack of institutional independence based 
solely on the appointment of the chair of the hearing panel. A 
unanimous panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal noted the 
non-controlling nature of Lamer C.J.'s minority opinion in Matsqui/ 46 
and also distinguished Lamer C.J.'s test for institutional independence 
on the facts of the case before them. 
As in Matsqui, Katz involved a challenge to an alleged 
structural flaw in delegated legislation that rendered the tribunal 
insufficiently independent. The flaw manifested itself in a lack of two 
"essential indicia of institutional independence"147 - security of 
tenure and remuneration - in that the by-laws provided for a hearing-
specific panel composed of a lawyer member chair, paid on a per hour 
basis, and two unpaid industry members. All members were chosen on 
a rotational basis from a standing 44-member hearing committee. 148 
The issue of administrative control was also argued, in that the lawyer 
chair of the standing hearing committee, responsible for officially 
appointing the hearing panel members, was in turn appointed by the 
executive committee, the body responsible for initiating the hearing 
process following potential violations by Exchange staff. Unlike the 
process in Matsqui, these procedures were in place for some time 149 
and had been used on a number of previous occasions, providing a 
history and evidence of how the by-laws were implemented in 
practice. 
145 
This was a right set out in s. 15 of the Securities Act. 
146 
Katz, supra note 141 at 426h. 
147 
Ibid. at 426. 
148 
In practice, the rotating list and the initial forwarding of potential names was 
managed by a senior employee of the Exchange. The practice was not provided 
for in the by-law. 
149 
Since 1991. See Katz, supra note 141 at 429c. 
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The first thing to observe is the influence of Lamer C.J.'s 
holding in Matsqui. All pai1ies, including the Securities Commission 
and the Com1 of Appeal, accepted the analytical framework set out by 
Lamer C.J. uncritically. The appellant framed his appeal by explicit 
reference to the terms outlined by Lamer C.J.: 150 both the Securities 
Commission and the Court of Appeal delivered a significant portion of 
their judgments in terms of the same (Lamer-enhanced) Valente 
criteria. 151 
The second central point to observe about the judgment is the 
method by which each of the Securities Commission and the Court of 
Appeal respond to the appellant's argument of a structural flaw based 
on the Lamer CJ. test. In both cases, their analysis relies wholly on 
evidence of practice and context, two terms central to the position 
expressed in Matsqui not by Lamer CJ., but by Sopinka J. This is, in 
fact, initiated by the appellants themselves prior to the Commission 
hearing, where they requested "information as to the disciplinarY, 
process, and, in particular, the process as it related to the appellant."
15
-
The lengthy response by Exchange counsel outlined the composition 
of the hearing committee, the history of selection of hearing panels 
generally, and a chronicle of the selection of the hearing panel in the 
instant matter. The appellant did not take issue with this statement, 
and it was accepted as fact by both the Commission and the Court of 
Appeal. It is impossible to reconcile this admission with the position 
stated by the appellant in the appeal, which depends solely on Lamer 
CJ.'s restriction of the test for institutional independence to the bare 
wording of the relevant by-law: 
1. The administrative scheme by which the Vancouver 
Stock Exchange appoints hearing panels under its by-laws is 
structurally flawed and does not meet the requisite level of 
institutional independence as set out in Matsqui .... The Exchange 
scheme neither provides security of tenure nor security of 
remuneration, the two principle [sic J factors that must be considered 
150 
Ibid., at 427. 
151 
Ibid., at 437d-h and 439a-g respectively. Unfortunately, it is even less rigorous 
than Lamer C.J.'s own test. Notably absent is any reference back to the specific 
wording of the by-laws of the Exchange. This is inexplicable under a detailed 
reading of Lamer C.J.'s Matsqui criteria. 
152 
lbid.1 at 429. 
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in determining whether the requisite level of institutional 
independence exists. 153 [emphasis added] 
Given this admission, it is perhaps not surprising that in making its 
decision, the Commission took into account "the purpose and 
responsibilities of the Exchange in disciplinary matters" and the 
"evidence of the practice established for the appointment of hearing 
committees."154 What is surprising, however, is that the Commission 
did not then go on to frame their rejection of the appellant's claim by 
relating the evidence to the test as set out by Sopinka J. involving 
considerations of purpose155 and practice. 
The Commission next went on to examine each of the three 
criteria of security of tenure, security of remuneration and adequate 
administrative control. In finding that all three were indeed satisfied, 
the Commission imposed Sopinka J. 's contextual analysis - although 




security of tenure: "any lack of formal security of tenure is 
not a realistic threat to .. .independence." 
security of remuneration: "nor is security of remuneration 
a concern in these circumstances ... .it is irrelevant for 
industry members .... [W]hile it is a theoretical possibility 
that the Exchange could refuse to pay accounts of a 
[lawyer] member whose decision was not considered 
appropriate, this is not a practical concern." 
administrative control: "by-law 5-20 ... makes clear that the 
hearing panel has control of the proceedings once a 
hearing begins ... [T]he appointment of hearing panel 
members is the responsibility of the Chairman of the 
hearing committee who is one of the lawyer members of 
the committee."156 
153 
Ibid., at 427. 
154 
Ibid., at 435. 
155 
While not specifically citing the wider "purposive" approach developed by 
Iacobucci J. in Pearlman among his dozen adumbrations of "context" in Matsqui, 
Sopinka J.'s acceptance of the relevance of "wider purpose" falls clearly within 
his stated area of implicit agreement with Lamer C.J. "Practice" is, of course, the 
mainstay of Sopinka J. 's difference with the Chief Justice. 
156 
AllfromKatz,supranote 141 at437. 
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The Court of Appeal, following the Commission below, also 
felt it necessary to go on to illustrate how each of the three factors 
were satisfied. Once again, they are dealt with in a manner clearly 
consistent with the approach recommended by Sopinka J. and not 
LamerC.J.: 
• security of tenure: "[ w ]hi le chairpersons 157 ••• do not have 
security of tenure based on any contractual rights or rights 
found in the by-law, the practice over the last few years 
demonstrates .... " 
• security of remuneration: "the evidence is clear that the 
lawyer members submit their fee for services ... and these 
fee accounts are paid as rendered. It is true that the lawyer 
members do not have a written contract...and there is 
nothing in the by-laws of the Exchange. Their right to be 
paid ... must be presumed as a matter of law." 
• administrative control: "is also not contractually stipulated 
or guaranteed in the by-laws but the evidence does not 
suggest any interference in the process.... The practice 
leads us to the conclusion that there is administrative 
independence. " 158 
This culminates in the Court unanimously finding that the legislation 
and the by-laws of the Exchange, when taken along with the practice 
of the tribunal, can be seen objectively to show that members of the 
hearing panel are sufficiently independent. 159 
The crucial thing to observe about the decision of the Court of 
Appeal is that in the above passages, the Comt observes that the 
panels indeed do fail - by the complete silence of the by-law - on 
all three of the indicia of institutional independence set out by Lamer 
CJ. Yet by imposing an analysis that is completely congruent with 
that proposed by Sopinka J., without acknowledging this fact, the 
court felt that it had sufficiently answered the question of institutional 
independence. This misapplies the mutually contradictory approaches 
set out by the two justices. 
157 
Recall that on appeal, the appellant reduced the allegation to lack of sufficient 
institutional independence in the chair alone. 
158 
Katz, supra note 141at439. 
159 
Ibid. 
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At least two questions arise from Katz which are relevant to 
the utility of Matsqui in examining institutional independence. First, 
given the inability of not just the decision-makers, but also the 
appellant himself, to confine an analysis to the bare wording of the by-
law, are we seeing evidence of how context exerts an inexorable 
pressure and thereby forces its own consideration? Second, on what 
basis, if any, may the factors specified by Lamer C.J. be satisfied by 
advancing operational context evidence as suggested by Sopinka J.? 
Neither question may be answered through recourse to the 
reasoning in Katz. That the Court of Appeal felt obliged to set out at 
great length160 sections of both Lamer C.J.'s and Sopinka J.'s 
reasoning in Matsqui, without once acknowledging their fundamental 
disagreement, is in itself worrisome. That worry is only confirmed by 
witnessing the ease with which Sopinka J.'s analysis is marshalled in 
response to Lamer CJ., without any indication that a choice is being 
made. The contextual approach clearly wins the day in Katz, 161 but the 
final ruling is offered as if it satisfies both methods. While these 
characteristics of Katz may be the result of sloppy decision-making on 
the part of the appellate judges, they might equally indicate that 
Matsqui provides no coherent guidance on dealing with the issue of 
institutional independence. In effect, Lamer CJ.'s approach is 
ignored. A pertinent question is whether this springs from the fact that 
in Katz, the hearing panel procedure, set out by the by-law, had five 
years of operational history. If this is so, it suggests the need to qualify 
Lamer C.J.'s holding in Matsqui, it is not to be ignored entirely. 
Perhaps it must be limited in its application not just to tribunals 
established by subordinate legislation, but also only to tribunals that 




Ibid. at 431-435. After setting out the headnote, Lamer CJ. is quoted at 432-433: 
Sopinka J. at 433-435. The court merely observes that Sopinka J. adds 
consideration of context, no mention is made of the implicit repudiation of Lamer 
C.J.'s analysis. The Securities Commission indicated that they do not consider 
Lamer C.J.'s holding as binding (at 426). 
And conceivably much earlier, given the appellant's own failure to realize that 
the evidence offered and accepted at the Commisison (supra notes 152-153 and 
accompanying text) is itself expressive of something more than an approach to 
the issue based on Lamer C.J.'s holding in Matsqui. 
Given Lamer C.J.'s dissentient position on the issue of institutional 
independence, the best fate might well be for it to be passed by as a curiosity. 
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It may be that the same result would arise in Katz without 
benefit of Matsqui, given the stress on context and flexibility in the 
administrative arena in earlier cases like Lippe, Genereux, Sethi, and 
Valente. This ignores the possibility, however, that the case itself 
might not have been brought forward but for Matsqui. A cynical 
reading of what Matsqui supplies, in light of Katz, could be that by his 
formalist minimalism Lamer C.J. has merely provided an easy way to 
challenge the adequacy of certain fora: what Sopinka J. has supplied, 
in turn, is a similarly formulaic method of responding to that 
challenge. 
Katz was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In a one-paragraph judgment delivered by Iacobucci J. for the 
full Court, the appeal was denied and the judgment of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal upheld. 163 The Sopinka J. standard of 
looking at the practice of the tribunal was adopted, without attribution, 
and Matsqui was distinguished on context. As can be seen from the 
judgment, quoted in its entirety below, no effort was made to explain 
how context could satisfy (or oust) Lamer C.J. 's formalist criteria: 
We agree with the British Columbia Court of Appeal that the 
practi;e of the tribunal in question is one of the many factors to 
consider in deten11ining whether the necessary degree of 
independence is present to avoid creating a perception of reasonable 
apprehension of bias. We also agree with the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal that the situation in this case, particularly its self-
regulatory context, is quite different from that which was present in 
... Matsqui. 164 
(ii) Bissett v. Canada (Minister of Labour) 
The issue in Bissett, a 1995 Federal Court, Trial Division 
decision on two opposing motions for stays of proceedings,165 
concerned whether a statutory appeal to a referee under the Canada 
163 




One motion was for a stay of proceedings of an appeal to a referee under the 
Canada Labour Code, the opposing motion was for a stay of proceedings of an 
application for judicial review of the originating decision of an inspector for the 
Ministry of Labour. 
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Labour Code 166 was an adequate alternative to judicial review. In some 
ways, the situation giving rise to the motions resembled the situation 
in Matsqui. The applicant, faced with a decision by a Ministry of 
Labour inspector, had a statutory right of appeal to a referee appointed 
by the Minister of Labour. He instead applied for judicial review, 
challenging the adequacy of the appeal procedure on the basis of 
jurisdiction, insufficient institutional independence on the part of the 
referee, and the alleged constitutional inability of the referee to review 
the inspector's decision. Matsqui was relied upon in regard to the first 
two issues. 167 On both, the applicant failed: the referee was found to 
possess sufficient institutional independence; furthermore the statutory 
appeal procedure was an adequate forum in which to entertain 
arguments and evidence regarding jurisdiction and all other issues. 
b C d 168 • Under authority of the Canada La. our o e, an mspector 
issued payment orders totalling over $500,000 representing unpaid 
wages, against the directors of a bankrupt corporation. Several of the 
directors claimed to have resigned from the board of the corporation 
prior to the dismissal of employees by the receiver; for this reason, 
they argued, neither the Ministry of Labour inspector nor the referee 
on appeal, had jurisdiction over them. In addition, in their application 
for judicial review to the Federal Court, they challenged the 
institutional independence of the inspector/referee regime: 
As to the nature of the appeal body, the applicants say that the 
referee does not have security of tenure, security of remuneration or 
independence from the executive and is therefore not institutionally 
independent, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. 169 
They also elaborated upon their argument regarding the particular 
factor of administrative control: 
The applicants' argument is not based on the particular individuals or 
circumstances involved, but on the scheme of the legislation. They 
say that the inspector is appointed by the Minister of Labour, as is 
the referee. In their view, this brings into question the referee's 
166 
R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2, as amended. 
167 
Bissett, supra note 142 at para. 8. 
168 
Section 251.l ( l ). 
169 
Bissett, supra note 142 at 768. 
148 CDN. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE [11 CJ.A.LP.] 
institutional independence. 170 
Although it is not reported in the case, it is presumed that the inspector 
is an employee of the Ministry of Labour, appointed under s. 
25 I.12(1) of the Canada Labour Code .171 The Court noted that the 
Canada Labour Code is silent on the issues of tenure and 
remuneration. Guidelines are apparently distributed to referees with 
their letter of appointment 172 but were not provided to the Court. 
The Ministry of Labour made two arguments in response. 
First, that there was no evidence showing a lack of any of the three 
criteria of security of tenure, security of remuneration, or 
inappropriate administrative control. This argument, while clearly 
incompatible with Lamer C.J.'s approach of looking at the wording of 
the legislation alone, fit within Sopinka J. 's widened notion of context. 
The second argument the Ministry made was that the dispute was 
premature. 173 Again, this argument is clearly compatible with Sopinka 
J.'s approach in Matsqui. 
Rothstein J. confirmed that Lamer C.J.'s reasoning in Matsqui 
on the appropriate application of the adequate alternative remedy 
applied. 174 But he found any attempt to apply Lamer C.J.'s reasoning 
on institutional independence to the case problematic: 
While I cannot say that parliament could never establish a scheme 
that might run afoul of the principle of institutional independence, 
that is not a question of whether a referee in a specific case is an 
adequate alternative to judicial review, having regard to the type of 
considerations suggested by Lamer CJ. in Matsqui. It is an argument 
that goes to the constitutional validity 175 of the referee provisions of 
the Canada Labour Code ... [UJnlike [Matsqui] where the relevant 
provisions were contained in what amounted to regulations, which, 
as subordinate legislation, could be challenged under ordinary 
170 
Ibid. at 771. 
171 
Canada Labour Code, supra note 166. See Bissett, supra note 142 at para. 11. 
172 
Bissett, ibid. at para. 22. 
173 
Ibid. at para. 19. 
174 
Ibid. at para. 8. 
175 
This is certainly a debatable proposition, but beyond the immediate concern of 
the current inquiry. 
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common law principles of ultra vi res, here the provisions in issue are 
contained in primary legislation.
176 
It is important to note Rothstein J.'s immediate default to Sopinka J.'s 
approach. Rothstein J. had little difficulty in accepting the ar~ument 
that, absent further evidence, it would be premature to decide the 
question of institutional independence. 
It is apparent to me, as it was to Sopinka J. in Matsqui, that it is not 
appropriate to fonn a final conclusion at this early stage as to the 
institutional independence of the referee on the basis only of a 
consideration of the Canada Labour Code and the appointment 
letter. Further evidence as to the nature of referee appointments, the 
basis of remuneration and other relationships, if any, between the 
referee the Minister and the inspector would be necessary in order 
' • 177 
that a decision as to institutional independence be an mformed one. 
Two aspects of how Matsqui was perceived in Bissett are particularly 
relevant to any analysis and assessment of institutional independence. 
First, Lamer C.J.'s formalist emphasis on the bare text of empowering 
legislation leaves open the possibility of mistaking an instit.ut_ional_ 
independence challenge for a constitutional challenge to the vahd1ty of 
the legislation. Second, the need to contextualize a challenge to a 
tribunal's independence is explicitly expressed in Bissett, whereas in 
Katz, it was only implicitly understood in the emphasis placed on 
evidence and practice. In relation to the first point, the sufficiency of 
Lamer C.J.' s approach even to subordinate legislation is thrown into 
question by the result in Katz. The Sopinka J. approach appea~s to ~e 
in the ascendant, and the importance of context, however defmed, 1s 
fmther confirmed. 
(iii) What Now? 
It is important to remember that in Matsqui, Lamer C.J., 
Sopinka J. and four additional justices agreed on the need to separate 
institutional independence and institutional impartiality. Katz and 
176 Supra note 142 at 77 L 
177 Ibid at 773. The type of "further evidence" required for an informed decision 
described here by Rothstein J. closely resembles the list drawn by Sopinka J. 
from his characteriza.tion of Mohammad (supra note 64) in Matsqui, supra note 5 
at 53. 
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Bissett confirm that this division will continue to be accepted, even in 
the absence of a clear articulation of the two concepts. These two 
subsequent cases also demonstrate that Lamer C.J.'s and Sopinka J.'s 
different evaluative criteria introduce what almost certainly is a less-
than-productive attempt to square the circle by driving decision-
makers to look first at the bare wording of an enabling regulatory 
scheme, in deference to Lamer C.J., then to examine its context and 
practice to satisfy Sopinka J. So far, it appears that Lamer C.J.'s 
criteria will be subsumed in Sopinka J.'s. This would certainly not 
violate Lamer CJ.'s earlier admonition to be flexible! But beyond 
this, Lamer C.J.'s approach would seem to have little to recommend it. 
The very nature of the contradiction presented by the two 
vying positions on institutional independence, in combination with the 
incompletely grounded nature of the reasoning, undermines the 
authoritativeness of Matsqui. As was apparent in Katz, Lamer C.J.'s 
approach in Matsqui ce11ainly offers a tidily restrictive framework, yet 
one which can easily be employed in ways other than intended. 
Whereas Sopinka J.'s approach, basically an insistent reminder of the 
relevance of context and practice, delivers little beyond a pragmatist's 
caution against excessive theoretical fugue, a call not to wander too far 
off into abstract and conceptual theory. 
Given the thesis concerning the internal flaws in the two 
approaches in Matsqui, it is likely that this situation will continue. The 
case will likely be further mined as support for various propositions 
concerning bias and its components, impartiality and independence. In 
the occasional case concerning institutional independence, a "mix-
and-match" approach will be taken towards the judgments of Lamer 
C.J. and Sopinka J. Despite being the most significant statement on the 
issue of institutional independence by the Supreme Court, the holdings 
in Matsqui will do nothing to settle the academic debates concerning 
independence of administrative tribunals. This need not have been so, 
had Lamer C.J. also attempted to ground his theory more closely in the 
practical realities under which tribunals operate, or if Sopinka J. had 
focused his treatment of context and practice as necessary 
components, and provided a much more ample response in terms of 
his difference with Lamer CJ. In the end, Lamer CJ.'s restrictive 
criteria will probably not affect the "revolution" referred to by 
Bryden, 178 nor will it, except in isolated cases of tribunals newly 
178 
See Bryden, supra note 35 at 49. 
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established under subordinate legislation, serve to alter the structure of 
many tribunals. Despite this, though, Matsqui will always present a 
tempting ground for litigants to challenge tribunals. However, its 
internal flaws - in logic, consistency and lack of grounding - will 
prevent successful understanding of institutional independence. 
5. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the foregoing that the issue of institutional 
independence concerns virtually all actors in the administrative arena 
- from the Supreme Court to academe, and from the Native tax 
assessor to the Privy Council. What is also evident from the justices of 
our highest court is that their divergent opinions concerning the 
necessary and sufficient indicia for independence - are they the 
words of the by-law? The operational context? - make it necessary to 
construct tribunals carefully. 
In R. W. Macaulay's 1989 study of Ontario regulatory 
agencies, he observes that 
[a] number of structural adjustments are needed to the agency system 
in order to improve its performance overall. These touch on the 
amalgamation or elimination of agencies, program evaluation, 
sunsetting, appointments, tenure, remuneration, training, a code of 
conduct and conflict of interest, the relationship between agencies 
and ministries, the authority of the chairperson and public access. 
The major obstacle to needed structural changes for agencies is the 
lack of consensus regarding their goals and reasons for initial 
creation. 179 
Macaulay, unlike Lamer CJ. in Matsqui, 180 makes no attempt to 
unduly stress one component, such as tenure or remuneration, over 
another. Note also that he describes all components as "structural" 
elements of "the agency system." Macaulay, it is contended, made a 
wiser choice of words than whoever first joined the term 
"institutional" to "independence" and "impartiality." Tenure, 
remuneration, and administrative control (that is, the possession of 
179 
180 
R.W. Macaulay, Directions: Review of Ontario's Regulatory Agencies (Toronto: 
Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1989), Overview, at 15. 
Drawing of course, from the line of cases beginning with Valente (supra note 
46), in which Dickson C.J. first offered the court's own mirror up, somewhat 
ambiguously, to tribunals. 
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one's own process) are, indeed, elements of the structure of tribunals. 
The other elements mentioned by Macaulay are also elements of that 
structure. If these are poorly served, it may well be that independence 
• 181 suffers as much as by any absence of tenure or remuneration. 
Macaulay draws attention to the lack of consensus regarding not just 
the goals of the tribunal system, but the very reason for its creation. 182 
Given the prescriptive enthusiasm of Lamer C.J. in Matsqui, any 
reasonable observer might assume the tribunal system was created 
simply to generate a number of small, imperfect courts. 
In extending the specific criteria from Valente into the realm 
of tribunals such as the Native assessment appeal boards, Lamer C.J. 
fails to take account of a host of pragmatic difficulties attendant in the 
creation of such agencies. Before insisting on abstract principles like 
secure tenure and sufficient remuneration, he would have been well 
advised to turn his mind, however informally, to a number of 
questions beyond even the operational context advised by Sopinka J. 
In general terms: How many appeals might actually arise in a year? 
What is the appropriate salary for a tribunal member? What quantum 
will likely make them independent? What quantum will not? Is a year 
a long enough period of tenure? Is seven years too long? And 
specifically in the Matsqui case: At what point, given the potential tax 
base in the reserve, does the cost of an appeal tribunal exceed the taxes 
collected? Will tribunal members, assured of position and pay, be 
unaware that too many judgments against a native band will make 
them cost-ineffective? At what point should bands throw up their 
hands and collapse the system into an appeal to the Federal Court, 
Trial Division only? Will this provide more or less opportunity to 
appeal an assessment? For whom? How will appealing every contested 
assessment (for those with deep enough pockets to do so) encourage 
aboriginal self-government? It might be said that these are not 
properly Lamer C.J.'s concerns. He simply needs to ensure that a 
tribunal functions sufficiently like a judicial analogue to satisfy his 
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concept of the "doctrine" of institutional independence, not whether 
the tribunal can or does work. On the other hand, the insufficiency of 
Sopinka J.'s response to Lamer C.J.'s sterile formalism makes it 
difficult to discern whether his more pragmatic and functional 
approach would itself open outward to the concerns expressed above. 
In almost every study and report prepared on the topic of 
independent agencies, it is noted that a significant number use part-
time members. 183 This single statistic is perhaps one of the most 
important when examining the need for independence: 
Independence ... seems to be affected by at least two factors. First, 
many agency members are part-time appointments. Being paii-time 
means that these people do not rely solely upon their position as an 
agency member for their livelihood. They can, therefore, 
theoretically afford to take an independent approach to their part-
time job and to resist any attempts by Government to influence their 
individual case decisions .... Some will not want to see that income 
lost on the altar of independence but clearly their dependence upon 
agency-related income is far less than that of a full-time employee. 184 
It is, therefore, the appointment process and fonn of member 
employment that become issues of paramount importance. Although 
patronage might seem to pertain more to impartiality than 
independence, its prevalence makes it a structural, even systemic, 
problem. This is a major deficiency in the Valente criteria. Failure to 
oust a tainted appointment process should be as equally egregious as 
lack of agency control of their own processes. Lamer C.J. 's Diceyan 
adherence to a delimited set of criteria, themselves a response to the 
operational context assessed in Valente, is, in the end, entirely 
arbitrary. 
The chasm between Lamer C.J. 's theoretical, yet restrictive, 
approach and Sopinka J.'s less-than-rigorously-defined "operational 
context" approach impedes, for the foreseeable future, development of 
a more coherent analysis of the issue. Although six justices did 
manage to agree on a number of factors, these factors cannot be used 
to any proper effect without agreement on the proper direction to take. 
If this can eventually be achieved, it would be best that the justices 
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attend more closely to the many voices, past and present, that have 
illuminated the essential nature of tribunals - the non-court aspects 
of administrative decision-making. In the meantime, as the pragmatic 
and functional approaches bleed through the strict doctrinal theory, it 
would be the lesser of two evils for the courts to favour the approach 
taken by Sopinka J. in Matsqui. 
